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BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROLAND KAUFMANN

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final default order and judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt lake County, State of Utah.
The judgment was entered on July 16, 1992.

The Notice of Appeal

was filed on August 17, 1992. The jurisdiction of the Utah Court
of Appeals rests upon Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(1991).
1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether a foreign, nonresident counterclaim defendant

was unreasonably denied the right to an evidentiary hearing to
contest the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over him
and/or defend on the merits by the denial of his motion for
continuance of trial date following notice of withdrawal and
subsequent nonappearance of his out-of-state trial counsel.
The standard of review on this issue is whether the trial
court

abused

its

discretion

circumstances of the case.

under

the

particular

facts

and

Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375,

1377 (Utah 1988).
2.

Whether a foreign, nonresident counterclaim defendant

was unreasonably denied the right to an evidentiary hearing to
contest the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over him
and/or defend on the merits by the entry of default judgment
against

him

following

notice

of

withdrawal

and

subsequent

nonappearance of his out-of-state trial counsel.
The standard of review on this issue is whether the trial
court

abused

its discretion

circumstances of the case.

under

the

particular

facts

and

Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375

(Utah 1977).
3. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support
a

finding that a foreign, nonresident

counterclaim defendant

voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction over him by
stipulation in this case.

2

The standard

^f r e v i e w ^

t*hi.*= issue

court's findinqs v-tre clear Iv erroneoui: e
!

IlltU4.

Is w h e t h e r t h e lower

Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co.

" "

Wr.t'Uhe.: . . L,L C G / U - I ^ O d I^-W^-.., suffered b y t h e seller a s

a result of h o n o r i n g a covenant n o t t o c o m p e t e in a c o n t r a c t f o r

aciditiu'.. *

c

n awaid c: cuk-jeiisaccry d a m a g e s 1^1

_o „^,- / c u t c:

t h e sales p r i c e ,

T h e 1 o A • : • • • : c o i :i::: : I::" s « :: c i I :: ' 1 u s i o n : f 3 : ' T : • i i t h :i s :i s s I i e :i
u n d e r a correction of error standard.

B a i l e y v. C a l l , 767 P. 2d 138

(Utah A p p . ) / c ert . denied, 7 73 P.2d 45 (U tah 1 9 8 9 ) .
DETERMINAT1VfclI''I IU \ <"' X S 1 ON.*»

i,« ,li d'VW

Although this appeal challenges s e v e r a l rulings of t h e lower
court pursuant to Utah R. C i v
the

-.::{:x\

_

j u r i s d i c t i o n ovei

^e

40(': r e s p e c t i v e l y in

coi_ \,

. foreign,

c:..-

- --"

sonal

nonresident defendant,

; n ,cf-s not

t u r n on che piopei j_uLer::~etatioii of zhec - : - o v : ^ - : n ? r e - <-e. They
are 7 therefore, r^nroduc.

in thft Append

CONSTIIUT~*ONV

1.

U . S . C o n s t , amend,

.

„:

.\ ^—-:.,.

uly.

jrxvGVISIONS

i

• Lddendi i

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

U t a h Code A n n . § 7 8- 2 7 - 2 4 (19 8 7)
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-

-

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
1.

Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 16(d)

Addendum C

2.

Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 37(b)(2)(C)

Addendum D

3.

Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 40(b), (c)

Addendum E

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was commenced by the plaintiff, Robert Radcliffe, as
an action for damages based upon fraudulent misrepresentations
allegedly made by the defendant and appellee, Sia Akhavan, and
others in connection with an agreement for the purchase and sale of
Akhavan's

equity

October, 1989.

interest
(R. 2-10).

in

General

Display

Corporation

in

Radcliffe alternatively prayed for

rescission of the agreement and restitution of his initial payment
thereunder.

(R. 9-10).

Akhavan responded by filing an answer and counterclaim against
Radcliffe, Republic International Corporation, Roland Kaufmann, a
Swiss investment banker and the appellant herein, and several
unnamed others alleging, inter alia/ breach of contract (Radcliffe
only), fraud and violations of state securities laws (Radcliffe,
Republic, and Kaufmann). (R. 18-27).

The assertion of specific

personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann was based upon the disputed
allegations that he:

(1) maintained a residence in Salt Lake

County; and (2) caused an injury within the State of Utah. (R. 19).

4

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
-h:^

j u r i s t : Lc:. i o n a j

issue

//^s c o n t e s t e d

b y --.he p a r t i e s
'

-..*-• ± i t j _ c a t i o r :

,.

_;.e c c / j : , i e . c l a i : . t .

hearing

Kaufmann':

Akhavan

"

record alone.

.

:• * -

.

-

.

-

the on itset of

I7-, i o w i i . r -

-ilsmisr

:\

in a

..onevidentiary
court;

r ; . ez

that

.

. CC<f-:7j.

Kaufmann the;. :;.-.•?. a;. c;.cv/e: duly

preserving - - - v^i sdiction^] ^ — ections <r - an aifirrrative defense,
ai id

t

,

.

On June 3 7,

.

.

] 9.92,

.

.

Kaufmann' s out-of-state lawyer filed a

notice and motion for leave to withdraw as counsel indicating that
he did not j ntend to appear at the trial on Jul ] , 7 ] 9:92
65),

(E 95:9

Kaufmann then retained new counsel who immediately m o v e d for

a continuance of trial date I n order t o obtain adequate time to
p r e p a r e the d e f e n s e ,

(R, 9 7 9 ) .

E ollowing a brief hearing on J illy

6, 19 92, t h e court denied t h e motion a n d ordered t h e trial t o
pi oceed 1: .he i:o] ] o\ n ng day.

(E ] 04 i ) •

DISPOSITION BELOW
At

this

point

in t h e proceedings,

t h e other

parties had

s e 11 ] e d t h e i r d i f' f e r e n c e s ,1 e a ^ r i n q c n ] y t h e c o u n t e r c 1 a i m against
Kauf mann f or tr ia ]

(R, 9 9 2; 10 2 4; 10 3 9 , • 1 0 5 ; )
:

held as scheduled or: "....;

and a default judgment.
Kaufmann

*92. Neither Kaufmann nor his trial

- .*•> % fvidonrr* v n ^ introduced by A k h a v a n

counsel appeared

against

Th e tr ia 1 w a s

including

.::*. amount ol "/jbti/ 'U.1-, was entered
an award

5

o f both

compensatory and

consequential damages. (R. 1050). He then filed this appeal. (R.
1066).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from a series of meetings and negotiations
among various individuals and corporate entities during the latter
half of 1989, which culminated in an agreement to purchase Sia
Akhavan's

equity

interest

in

General

Litigation

commenced when the proposed

Display

financing arrangements

supporting the agreement failed to materialize.
issues

of

fact

turn

on

the

Corporation.

precise

The material

intentions,

contacts,

representations, and roles of the various individuals and entities
involved.

Since these disputed issues are the same ones which

create a legal basis for the assertion

of specific personal

jurisdiction over the counterclaim defendant and appellant, Roland
Kaufmann, and since they constitute the basis of his defenses on
the merits, a brief recitation of those facts will be presented
here.
PARTIES
1.

Sia Akhavan, is an individual resident of Salt Lake

County. (R. 264). From June 21, 1988, to October, 1989, he was a
shareholder, officer, and director of General Display Corporation.
(R. 264).
2.

General

Display

Corporation

Display") is a Utah corporation

6

(hereinafter

engaged

"General

in the business of

desiring,

fabricating,

and

.;

.

-

commercial client
3.
Display

Juei M. ' .r • ' "•
during

r.dividual, was president of General

th>, uiiu. ^ei„:.ds

involved

herein.

(R. 113).

(Neither LaSalle nor General Display are parties to this appeal.)
4.

r - '- -

' ;- " ' r :e is a resident of Salt Lake

- -""-/•---

County and presic-r/: ci r-p^r*-.^. International Corporation. (R. 3;
19).
5.

R epub J i • :

" R e p u b l i c " : _-- ..
L a k e Co^nt-.

6.

I n t e i: n a t i o i I a 1

-, ;• c o r p o r a t i o n w h i c h a.cir:tal;:s o f f i c e s in Salt

*•- ..,_,.

Roland

^Neither R a d c l i f f e n o r R e p u b l i c is a p a r t y

Kaufmann,

5s

a

r e s i d e n t of Z u r i c h , S w i t z e r l a n d ,
'•:-.-:..._

:... o

resigned

7.

Swiss
(R

investment

525—27).

:. s a n o f f i c e r a n d d i r e c t o r

from the company prior

counterclaim,

(h e i e :i n - - •";

C :: • i: p o r a t i c • n

I: : the

banker

and

A l t h o u g h lie once
I' e p u b i i c , 11 r* 1 \ a 6

of

events

alleged

in the

(R, ] 94; 52 6).

Emanuel 1 s„

F l o o r , an .

,

. ...-

R o b e r t R a d c l i f f e , w a s involved as a p a r t i c i p a n t ;.r. t:he n e g o t i a t i o n s
at issue h e r e i n ,
8.

(R

19 5 - 96).

Electra -Graphics Int. enuj (. mini .1,, I in

ulln e„i iia 1" te J EGi i i

a U t a h c o r p o r a t i o n of w h i c h Emanuel Floor is p r e s i d e n t ,
E G I contr^c 1 -- 3 ^ *•
*

_

counterclaim.
"CUJ-S

- nrrhp^*: o^r^-ln ^sse 4 "- of G e n e r a l

;F;

(R. 2 6 6 ) ,
Displav

-

102-C<\

N e i t h e r F l o o r r1 . -

arr.e:
7

~

.? a pari.;

TRANSACTIONAL FACTS
In June or July of 1989, Radcliffe and Emanuel Floor, acting
either

individually

or on

behalf

of

Republic,

entered

into

negotiations with Akhavan, Joel LaSalle, and General Display for
the purchase of certain computer programs, graphic displays, and
other assets owned by the company.
resulted

in a Letter Agreement

(R. 266). These negotiations
executed

by General Display,

Akhavan, LaSalle, and Elektra-Graphics International, on July 27,
1989.

(R. 266; 203).

Elektra-Graphics was a Utah corporation

organized as a vehicle for the purchase and development of the
business.

(R. 266). Under this proposal, Republic was to finance

certain aspects of the transaction under a side agreement with EGI.
(R. 266; 207). (Radcliffe denied Akhavan's claim that Republic was
also to become a shareholder and control the company.)
195).

(R. 266;

Although Republic did provide funding of $100,000, the

transaction was ultimately abandoned.

(R. 267). Although Akhavan

claimed in an affidavit that the transaction was cancelled at
Kaufmann's request, (R. 267), this contention was denied by both
Kaufmann and Radcliffe.

(R. 527; 778).

The facts surrounding Kaufmann's involvement in the next round
of

negotiations

are

also

in dispute

as

illustrated

by

the

conflicting affidavits themselves.
AKHAVAN:
"13. On or about August 12, 1989, LaSalle and I attended a
meeting with Kaufmann, Radcliffe and Floor. Kaufmann proposed that
he purchase a fifty percent (50%) interest in General Display on
8

behalf of Republic or another one of his corporations.

Kaufmann

offered $2.8 million for fifty percent (50%) of General Display and
indicated that he would subsequently do a public offering to
generate between $2 million and $3 million."

(R. 267).

RADCLIFFE:
M

9.

Paragraph 13 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit is untrue.

I was

present at the meeting held on August 12, 1989 by and between
KAUFMANN, RADCLIFFE, Emanuel A. Floor
LASALLE and AKHAVAN.

(hereinafter

"FLOOR"),

KAUFMANN made no offer concerning a 50%

interest in General Display Corporation

(hereinafter

"GENERAL

DISPLAY") for $2.8 million or any other amount. No one else at the
meeting made such a ludicrous offer.

Further, KAUFMANN did not

indicate that he would subsequently do a public offering.

He did

indicate that, as an investment banker, he would introduce GENERAL
DISPLAY to various underwriters in New York City who, he felt,
would be interested in conducting a public offering for GENERAL
DISPLAY."

(R. 195-96).

AKHAVAN:
"14. On or about August 17, 1989, Kaufmann invited LaSalle and
myself to a meeting with F. N. Wolfe & Company, a New York based
securities underwriter.

A merger between General Display and a

California

public

company,

Bristol

Research

("Bristol") was

discussed.

General Display then presented a letter of interest

indicating that the company desired to enter into a Merger
Agreement with Bristol, obtain bridge financing in the amount of
$500,000.00 and commit to an underwriting which would result in $5
9

million to $6 million being raised for the merged Bristol/General
Display Corporation."

(R. 267).

RADCLIFFE:
"10. In paragraph 14 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit, AKHAVAN fails
to attach the letter he wrote to Bristol Research Corporation
(hereinafter "BRISTOL") from GENERAL DISPLAY.

A true and correct

copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Further,
AKHAVAN fails to attach the letter from F. N. Wolfe & Co. Inc. to
BRISTOL which he signed. A true and correct copy of that letter is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C".

KAUFMANN, RADCLIFFE, FLOOR, and

REPUBLIC are not parties to these documents."

(R. 196).

AKHAVAN;
"15. Under the provisions of the agreement to merge with
Bristol, I was to serve as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of the merged company.

On or about August 28,

1989

plant in Costa Mesa,

I visited

Bristol's manufacturing

California and met with the Board of Directors of Bristol." (R.
268) .
"16. Around this time, Floor, Kaufmann and Radcliffe began
representing to other parties that Floor was the Chairman of the
Board of General Display.

In fact, this was not true and was not

consistent with the previous negotiations.

For this and other

reasons, I was unwilling to commit my interest in General Display
to the merger. However, in an effort to accommodate the parties I
agreed to sell my interest thereby allowing General Display to
continue with the merger."

(R. 2 68).
10

RADCLIFFE:
"11. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit are untrue.
I was present at the board of directors meeting of BRISTOL. FLOOR
was introduced as chairman of the board of GENERAL DISPLAY and
neither AKHAVAN nor LASALLE made any objection.

Further, at the

meeting, an election was held and FLOOR was elected as chairman of
the board of BRISTOL so that the merger could be concluded
efficiently."

(R. 196).

"12. On or about September 23, 1989, Kelly J. Flint, attorney
for GENERAL DISPLAY wrote a letter to F.N. Wolfe and Company that
GENERAL DISPLAY was interested in concluding the merger with
BRISTOL.

Therefore, AKHAVAN1s statement in paragraph 16 of his

Affidavit that he was unwilling to commit his interest in GENERAL
DISPLAY to the merger is patently false, at least until after
September 23, 1989."

(R. 196-97).

AKHAVAN:
"17. Throughout this time I assumed that Kaufmann, acting
through Republic, Radcliffe

and/or Floor, would

purchase my

interest in General Display. It is my understanding that Radcliffe
and Floor are merely fronts for Roland Kaufmann. In fact, Kaufmann
represented to me on more than one occasion that he was "the money
man" and Radcliffe and Floor were fronts for him.

Kaufmann also

represented that he "owned" Republic along with two other public
companies.

Radcliffe also stated that Kaufmann "owned" Republic

and "called the shots" with respect to the Company. Radcliffe told
me that after the closing of the Agreement to purchase my stock,
11

Kaufmann would nominate which company would hold the General
Display interests."

(R. 268).

RADCLIFFE:
"13. Paragraph

17 of AKHAVAN!S

Affidavit

is

false.

I

commenced negotiation to purchase AKHAVAN!S stock on or about
October 1, 1989 as an individual and not as an officer of REPUBLIC.
I conducted and concluded those negotiations as an individual and
not on behalf of anyone else.

As stated in my deposition, there

were discussions that I may assign my interest to a third party;
however, none of those potential assignments were consummated.

I

never made any representation to anyone that KAUFMANN "owned"
REPUBLIC.

REPUBLIC is a publicly-traded company and the stock

ownership is clearly reflected in public documents on file."

(R.

197).
"5g. Roland Kaufmann has never stated to anyone in my presence
that he "owns" Republic.

If he had ever done so, I would have

corrected him at that moment."

(R. 776).

AKHAVAN:
"18. Thereafter, I entered into negotiations with Kaufmann,
Radcliffe, and Floor who I believed were acting individually and on
behalf of Republic, for the purchase of my interest in General
Display.

On or about October 20, 1989, an agreement entitled

"Memorandum of Oral Agreement by and between Robert D. Radcliffe
and Sia Akhavan Re:

General Display Corporation" was executed

memorializing the sale of my interest in General Display.

A true

and correct copy of this Memorandum of Oral Agreement is attached
12

hereto as Exhibit

M

E".

Kaufmann was instrumental in negotiating

the terms and conditions of the October 20, 1989 Agreement."

(R.

269).
RADCLIFFE:
"14. Paragraph

18 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit

is false.

I

personally had negotiations with Mr. Michael Katz, of the law
offices of Burbidge & Mitchell, who acted on behalf of AKHAVAN.
These negotiations

commenced

on or about

October

1, 1989

and

culminated in the October 19 Memorandum attached to the AKHAVAN
Affidavit

as Exhibit

"E".

To my

knowledge, KAUFMANN

negotiations whatsoever with Mr. Katz or AKHAVAN.

had

no

At no time did

Mr. Katz or AKHAVAN suggest that KAUFMANN, FLOOR or REPUBLIC be
included as parties to my purchase agreement.

It is clear from the

agreement that my own personal stock in REPUBLIC was contemplated
to be used to collateralize the agreement."
In the

hearing on July

7, 1992, and

(R. 197-98).
in the absence

of

Radcliffe, Kaufmann, or Kaufmann's attorney, Akhavan presented
unchallenged

testimony

regarding

supporting his theory of liability.

the

facts

and

(Tr. 3-10).

circumstances

The main points

of that testimony may be summarized as follows:
1.

Akhavan learned from Joel LaSalle that "Kaufmann" was

interested in buying his interest in General Display in September,
1989.

(Tr. 3-4; Finding of Fact No. 6, R. 1044).
2.

Akhavan met with Radcliffe and Floor whom he understood

were acting as Kaufmannfs agents in early October, 1989, to discuss
the terms of the deal.

(Tr. 4; Finding of Fact No. 6, R. 1044).
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3.

At that meeting, a purchase price for Akhavanfs equity

interest was agreed upon, but the terms of payment were not.

(Tr.

4; 6-7; Finding of Fact No. 6, R. 1044).
4.

Akhavan subsequently met later that month with Kaufmann

himself "at his offices in Fort Union Boulevard" and negotiated the
remaining terms of the deal.

(Tr. 5; Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9,

R. 1044-45).
5.

At this meeting, Radcliffe was directed by Kaufmann to

draft the purchase agreement on his behalf.
6.

(Tr. 5-6).

The agreement dated October 19, 1989, which was signed by

Radcliffe (individually) and Akhavan contains the terms of the
agreement with "Kaufmann."
45).

(Tr. 5; Finding of Fact No. 9, R. 1044-

The agreement itself is attached hereto as Addendum F.
At the hearing on July 7, 1992, Akhavan also presented

unchallenged testimony regarding damages.

That testimony was

summarized in the court1s Finding of Fact No. 9 as follows:
"(a) Purchase

price

of

$300,000.00,

payable

$50,000.00

immediately with the balance of $250,000.00 to be paid
over 18 months at an interest rate of 10%;
(b) Akhavan agreed not to work or compete in the commercial
signage industry.

This covenant not to compete was for

a period of two years;
(c) Kaufmann and Akhavan agreed that Akhavan would receive
25% of the net proceeds from any judgment or settlement
of the lawsuit entitled General Display Corporation v.
The Walt Disney Company; and
14

(d) If

any

lawsuit

arose

from

their

agreements,

the

prevailing party would be entitled to attorney's fees."
Although Akhavan was paid $50,000 initially, he was not paid
the other amounts owed under the contract.

(Tr. 7-8; Finding of

Fact No. 12, R. 1046).
Although not challenged at the hearing, much of Akhavanfs
testimony was controverted by affidavits previously filed.
RADCLIFFE:
"6.

KAUFMANN has no designated office at REPUBLIC.

As an

investment banker, it is customary for him to make periodic
inspection trips to companies in which he has caused the placement
of funds.

As a courtesy, REPUBLIC has made a private office

available to him, which we do for any visitors.
AKHAVAN's

Affidavit

Paragraph 8 of

therefore raischaracterizes RADCLIFFE's

deposition testimony."

(R. 195).

M

6a. On or about October 20, 1989, Sia Akhavan entered into a

written Memorandum of Oral Agreement to sell his 50% interest in
General Display to me.

A down payment of $50,000 was made,

however, the share certificate, later issued, was never transferred
or endorsed to me. There is no provision in the agreement whereby
I am required to assign any purported stock interest to any unnamed
third parties."e.

(R. 776-77).

Roland Kaufmann did not have authority to make final

decisions with regards to Republic International Corporation or
Radcliffe, assuming that is what Akhavan means by his statement
contained in paragraph 7 of his Affidavit.
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Further, Mr. Kaufmann

has never used Republic or me as a "front or an Malter~ego" as
asserted in paragraph 7." (R. 778-79).
Finally, in his own affidavit, Kaufmann clearly stated that:
KAUFMANN:
"Contrary to the allegations of Counterclaimant, I do not own
any property in the Salt Lake City area, or anywhere in the State
of

Utah.

My

primary

residence

and

domicile

is

in

Zurich

Switzerland.
I am not an officer of Republic International Corporation, and
was not an officer of that corporation at any time referred to in
the Counterclaim.
I am not a shareholder in Republic Corporation, and have not
been a shareholder at any time referred to in the Counterclaim.
I am not a shareholder in Republic Corporation, and have not
been a shareholder at any time referred to in the Counterclaim.
I do not maintain a place of business or office in the State
of Utah.

On occasional visits to Utah, I have been permitted the

use of an office at Republic International Corporation.
I was not a party to any of the agreements referred to in the
Counterclaim, either in an individual or representative capacity.
I made no guarantees or commitments, either in an individual or
representative capacity to Sia Akhavan, and did not advance any
funds or transfer to General Display Corporation any shares of
Republic International Stock."

(R. 526-27).

16

PROCEDURAL FACTS
Motion to Dismiss
The factual and legal bases justifying the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over Roland Kaufmann were contested several
times prior to trial.

Personal jurisdiction was disputed by

Radcliffe on Akhavan's motion to join Kaufmann as an additional
party defendant.
Kaufmann's

motion

(R. 49; 235). It was disputed again pursuant to
to

vacate

default

certificate

which

also

challenged Akhavan's attempted service of process in Switzerland.
(R. 517; 525). The latter problem was resolved by stipulation of
counsel in which it was agreed that Kaufmannfs jurisdictional
objections would be preserved.

(R. 543).

In challenging the personal jurisdiction of the court on his
motion to dismiss, Kaufmann denied both the accuracy and legal
sufficiency of Akhavan's allegations that he purposefully took any
action which would subject him to the jurisdiction of Utah courts.
(R. 553-55; 545-52; 525-27; 638). He also denied that he owned any
property in Utah or was involved in the transaction in any way
other than as the financial advisor and investment banker for
Republic. Id. Following a nonevidentiary hearing held on March 4,
1991, the court denied the motion based on the documentary record
alone, finding that Kaufmann had sufficient minimal contacts with
the forum so as to satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §7827-22 et seq. (1969) and the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(R. 666-

67) . Kaufmann then filed his Answer to Counterclaim preserving his
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jurisdictional objections as an affirmative defense.

(R. 671-79,

678) .
Trial Settings
On December 11, 1991, this case was set for nonjury trial
commencing on March 24, 1992, (R. 891), and a pretrial settlement
conference was scheduled in Salt lake City on March 16, 1992. (R.
893). On January 8, 1992, Kaufmann1s Washington D.C. counsel filed
a motion for continuance of trial date on the grounds that he was
scheduled to appear as counsel for plaintiff at a trial in Fairfax
County, Virginia, commencing

on March

23, 1992.

(R. 898).

Although Akhavan's counsel objected to the motion (R. 906), it was
granted by the court (R. 905), and trial was rescheduled on
February 10, 1992, to begin on July 7, 1992.

(R. 928).

Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel
Kaufmann was originally represented by the Washington, D.C.
law firm of METZGER, GORDON, SCULLY & MORTIMER with Leslie Ann
Haacke as local counsel. (R. 528-31). On May 27, 1992, Ms. Haacke
notified the court that she had relocated from Salt Lake City to
Phoenix, Arizona, thus leaving Kaufmann without benefit of any real
"local" counsel.

(R. 931).

On June 17, 1992, Kaufmann's Washington D.C. lawyer filed a
notice and motion to withdraw as counsel indicating that because of
a conflict with his client over payment of attorney's fees, he did
not intend to appear at trial on July 7, 1992.

(R. 959-65).

He

also stated that Kaufmann had indicated that he did not intend to
have substitute counsel enter an appearance at that time.
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(R.

961).

At this point, Kaufmann had no local counsel in Salt Lake

City to represent him.

(R. 931).

Motion for Entry of Default Judgment
On June 29, 1992, a pretrial settlement conference was held in
Salt Lake City. (R. 1007).

Although his Washington D. C. counsel

participated in the conference, Kaufmann himself did not appear. (R
1036).

At the conference, the court required confirmation from

Kaufmann that he did not object to the withdrawal of his counsel
and did not intend to appear at trial as a condition of granting
the motion to withdraw.

(R. 1028).

The court apparently also

informed Kaufmann1s counsel that if no appearance were made at
trial, a default judgment would be entered against his client.

(R.

1036).

Akhavanfs counsel served a motion to that effect on July 1,

1992.

(R. 1008).
On being advised of the situation, Kaufmann immediately wrote

to the court stating that he could not attend trial on July 7,
1992, for financial reasons, and requesting a continuance of trial
date until September or October, 1992,

to allow sufficient time

for new Utah counsel to be retained and prepare his defense.
1037).
July

(R.

He also requested that his trial counsel be retained until
31,

1992.

(R.

1037).

His

Washington

D.C.

counsel

concurrently filed a memorandum in opposition to Akhavan's motion
for entry of default judgment on July 1, 1992, citing a conflict of
interest with his client.

(R. 1027-29).
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Motion for Continuance
Kaufmann then retained Paul M. Durham of DURHAM & EVANS in
Salt Lake City who entered a special appearance on July 2, 1992,
for the sole purpose of moving for a continuance of trial date on
the grounds that Kaufmann genuinely desired to appear at trial and
defend the action; that he believed

he

had

substantial

and

meritorious defenses to all of the claims; that he would take all
necessary action to assist in preparation for trial; that he and
his original

counsel had encountered

serious and

substantial

disagreements and misunderstandings to the degree that original
counsel could not continue to represent him; that the Motion to
Withdraw had not been ruled upon; and that, due to the complexity
of the case, new counsel could not adequately prepare for trial
without a continuance.

(R. 979).

Following a brief hearing on

July 6, 1992, the court denied the motion.

(R. 1044).

Trial was held as scheduled the next day in the absence of
both Kaufmann and his trial counsel.

(R. 1042-43).

Kaufmann1s

special counsel appeared briefly to make a record with respect to
his motion for continuance and was excused.

(R. 1043). The court

then entered Kaufmann's default and proceeded to take unchallenged
testimony from Akhavan and his witnesses on the issues of liability
and damages.

(R. 1043-47).

Following the hearing, the court entered a default judgment
against Kaufmann together with a specific jurisdictional finding to
the effect that "Kaufmann was properly served with process in this
action and by stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's
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jurisdiction

over

him."

(Finding

Conclusion of Law No. 1, R. 1047).

of

Fact

No.

1,

R.

1043;

The court also awarded Akhavan

both compensatory and consequential damages for breach of contract
and fraud.

(R. 1045; 1047-48, R. 1050).

This appeal followed.

(R. 1066).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING KAUFMANN!S MOTION
FOR

CONTINUANCE

UNDER

THE

PARTICULAR

FACTS

AND

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
A.

The Lower Court Must Act Reasonably in Denying a Motion
for Continuance.

The trial court has discretion to continue a trial upon a
showing of good cause.

Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 40(b).

The trial court's action in denying a continuance will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the court has abused that discretion by
acting unreasonably. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989);
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988); Miller Pontiac,
Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981).
In determining whether to grant a continuance, the trial court
should consider the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, weighing the rights of the party requesting it against the
harm that may result from delay.

Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853

(Colo. 1985); 17 Am. Jur. 2d. Continuance §4 (1990).
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The trial court's legitimate concern for prevention of delay
in the trial of cases should not prejudice the substantial rights
of a party by forcing him to go to trial without being able to
fairly present his case. Yates v. Superior Court In and For Pima
County, 120 Ariz. 436, 586 P.2d 997 (Ariz. App. 1978); Gonzales v.
Harris, 189 Colo. 518, 542 P.2d 842 (1975).
B.

Kaufmann*s Due Process Right to an Evidentiary Hearing on
the Jurisdictional Issue was Entitled to Considerable
Weight in the Balancing Process.

Kaufmann was entitled
objections

to

the

court's

to an evidentiary
assertion

of

hearing

specific

on his
personal

jurisdiction over him under guidelines recently approved by the
Utah Supreme Court, since Akhavan's allegations were specifically
controverted

by

affidavit

and

because

determination

of

the

jurisdictional issue turns on the same facts as the merits of the
case. Anderson v. American Soc'v of Plastic Surgeons 807 P.2d 825
(Utah 1990) .
In determining whether to grant a continuance, the court
should examine the reasonableness of a request in light of the
tradition that a party should be afforded every opportunity to be
in attendance at trial.

Bairas v. Johnson/ 13 Utah 2d 269, 373

P.2d 375 (1962) .
C.

The Lower Court's Denial of a Continuance was
Unreasonable Under the Particular Circumstances of This
Case.

1.

Kaufmann is a foreign, nonresident defendant residing in

Zurich,

Switzerland

who

consistently

jurisdiction over him.
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challenged

the

court's

2.

Kaufmann's out-of-state counsel moved to withdraw just

three weeks before trial, indicating that he did not intend to
appear at the trial,
3.

The attorney-client relationship between Kaufmann and his

out-of-state counsel had so completely broken down by this time
that Kaufmann could not be adequately represented without first
obtaining new counsel.
4.

Kaufmann retained new Utah counsel on July 1, 1992, who

immediately moved for a continuance on the grounds, inter alia/
that the case was so complex that he could not adequately defend
without additional time to prepare for trial.
5.

Kaufmann believes he has substantial and meritorious

defenses to all of Akhavan's claims and genuinely desires to appear
and defend the action.
6.

Akhavan failed to demonstrate any specific prejudice

occasioned by a two or three month delay beyond the burden of the
delay itself.
7.
default

Kaufmann has suffered severe prejudice by having a
judgment

entered

against

him

based

in part

upon a

jurisdictional finding which is not supported by any evidence in
the record.
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II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AGAINST KAUFMANN UNDER THE PARTICULAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE,
Because of the close connection between Kaufmann's motion for
continuance and Akhavan's motion for entry of default judgment, the
same factors considered above in balancing the competing interests
of the parties are relevant here-

In addition, this court has

observed that a default judgment is an unusually harsh remedy that
should be meted out with caution. Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452
(Utah App. 1991).

See also, Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375

(Utah 1977); Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d
703 (Utah 1965); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah
1953).
This is not a case of willfulness, bad faith, or fault which
justifies entry of default judgment as
noncomplying party.

a

sanction against a

See, Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 7 68

P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989).
The reasonableness of the court's ruling in this case must be
viewed from the factual and legal context in which it occurred.
Kaufmann was a foreign, nonresident living thousands of miles from
the forum who had effectively lost the adequate representation of
his out-of-state counsel three weeks prior to trial.

He had

previously challenged the courtfs personal jurisdiction over him
and was entitled under Utah law to an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. He took immediate steps to secure new Utah counsel and move
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for a continuance once he had been advised of the court's pretrial
rulings. He was prejudiced by entry of default judgment in that he
was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present his case in
court.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT KAUFMANN
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT'S JURISDICTION
IN THIS CASE.
The court fs finding of fact and conclusion of law that
Kaufmann voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction by
stipulation

in this case in clearly

erroneous, since it is

unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and is in fact directly
contradicted by all of the evidence in the record.
Kaufmann has been prejudiced by this finding and conclusion,
since the stated basis of the court's personal jurisdiction over
him is completely groundless.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES IN THIS CASE, SINCE

IT AFFORDED AKHAVAN A

DOUBLE RECOVERY,
In Utah, compensatory

and consequential

damages may be

recovered for breach of contract. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Recoverable damages for fraud are based upon
the benefit of the bargain rule.
607 (Utah 1974).

Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602,

Both measures of damages are limited by the rule

prohibiting a double recovery.

Cook Assoc, Inc. v. Warnick/ 664
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P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983) (contract); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143
(Utah App. 1992) (fraud).
In this case, the terms of the contract itself indicate that
the covenant not to compete was not separately valued.
90).

(R. 289-

It follows that the consideration given by the buyer for the

business included payment for the seller's promise not to compete
for a period of two years after the sale, By permitting Akhavan to
recover the full amount of the purchase price, the court made him
whole under the contract and afforded him the full benefit of his
bargain. To go beyond that and permit additional damages measured
by the alleged value of honoring his covenant not to compete, the
court allowed Akhavan to exact a double recovery in contravention
of law.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
KAUFMANNfS MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE,
BECAUSE

ITS RULING HAS UNREASONABLE

UNDER

THE

PARTICULAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

A,

The Lower Court Must Act Reasonably in Denying a Motion
for Continuance.

Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon
such

terms

as may be just, including

the payment

of

costs

occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding
upon

good

cause

shown."

The
26

rule

also

provides

for

the

preservation of witness1 testimony subject to the same objections
that may be made with respect to depositions if required by the
adverse party.

Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 40(c).

The granting of a continuance rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
court has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably.

Hardy v.

Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989), citing Christenson v.
Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988), and Miller Pontiac, Inc.
v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1981).

In determining whether

to grant a continuance, the trial court should consider the
circumstances of each particular case, weighing the rights of the
party requesting it against the harm that may result from delay.
Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985); 17 Am. Jur. 2d.
Continuance §4 (1990).

The trial court's legitimate concern for

prevention of delay in the trial of cases should not prejudice the
substantial rights of a party by forcing him to go to trial without
being able to fairly present his case. Yates v. Superior Court In
and For the County of Pima, 120 Ariz. 436, 586 P.2d 997 (Ariz. App.
1978); Gonzales v. Harris, 189 Colo. 518, 542 P.2d 842 (19751.
In addition to the above, courts have cited several factors to
be considered in deciding whether to grant a continuance. Abuse of
discretion may be found, for example, where a party has made timely
objections, given necessary notice, and made reasonable efforts to
have a trial date reset for good cause.
P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977).

Griffiths v. Hammon, 560

Other factors include the length of

the delay requested, whether the delay will prejudice the opposing
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party, and whether the grant or denial will be in the furtherance
of justice.
B.

17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance §4 (1990).

Kaufmann's Due Process Right to an Evidentiary Hearing on
the Jurisdictional Issue was Entitled to Considerable
Weight in the Balancing Process.

Kaufmannfs legal position before trial is another

relevant

factor to consider in determining whether the lower court acted
unreasonably in denying his subsequent motion for continuance,
since it raises the level of concern for the adequate protection of
his due process right to a judgment based upon the constitutional
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). It is
also in accordance with the view that the court should examine the
reasonableness

of a request for continuance in light of the

tradition that a party should be afforded every opportunity to be
in attendance at trial. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P. 2d
375 (1962).
In this case, Akhavan's original contention that the district
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann under the
state's long arm statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24 (1987), rested
upon two distinct grounds:
Lake

County;

and

(1) maintenance of a residence in Salt

(2) causing

(Counterclaim «[ 4, R. 19).

an

injury

within

the

state.

The first ground was subsequently

discarded, since none of the claims involved in this case arose
from ownership, use, or possession of the property.

Thus the

remaining justification for assertion of the court's specific
personal jurisdiction under the pleadings was the "causing of any
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injury within
warranty."

this

state whether

tortious

or by

breach

of

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(3)(1987) .

The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the guidelines to be
utilized in analyzing problems of specific personal jurisdiction
under the long-arm statute.
inquiry:

This analysis requires a two-part

(1) Whether the proponent's claims arise from one of the

activities listed in the statute; and (2) whether the opponent's
contacts with the forum are sufficient to satisfy the due process
clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution. Arcruello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838
P.2d. 1120 (Utah 1992).

Before reaching this stage, however, the

court must first determine how to proceed when the proponent's
jurisdictional allegations are controverted by affidavit, and when
jurisdiction turns on the same facts as the merits of the case.
This preliminary problem was squarely raised in Anderson v.
Am. Soc. of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah
1990).

In that case, a patient brought an action against a

nonresident sponsor and medical monitor of an experimental facial
treatment program.

The Third Judicial District Court granted

motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis
of the pleadings and documentary evidence and the patient appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the order of dismissal and
remanded for trial on the merits with an order to postpone any
ruling on personal jurisdiction until after plaintiff had presented
her case. Anderson, 807 P.2d at 826.
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In reaching this decision, the Court approved the following
guidelines for use by the trial court in determining the limits of
its territorial jurisdiction:
1.

If it proceeds on documentary evidence alone (i.e.,
the first two methods), the plaintiff is only
required to make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction. The plaintiff's factual allegations
are
accepted
as
true
unless
specifically
controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by
depositions, but any disputes in the documentary
evidence are resolved in the plaintiff!s favor.
The trial court must not weigh the evidence unless
a hearing is held.

2.

Unless an evidentiary hearing is held, the
plaintiff must prove jurisdiction at trial by a
preponderance of the evidence after making a prima
facie showing before trial.
When jurisdiction
turns on the same facts as the merits of the case,
an evidentiary hearing is inappropriate because it
infringes on the right to a jury trial and is an
inefficient use of judicial resources (hearing the
same evidence twice); in such cases—if the
plaintiff has made a prima facie showing—
jurisdiction is determined by trial on the merits.

Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827.
In Kaufmann, it is clear that Akhavan's jurisdictional claims
turn on the same -facts as the merits of the case.

In fact, they

could hardly be otherwise, since his theories of liability turn on
the nature and content of certain alleged contacts made by Kaufmann
and his alleged agents over the course of several months.
The alternative contract and fraud theories of liability
advanced by Akhavan are all based upon his interpretation of
Kaufmann1 s role

in a

series

of meetings, negotiations, and

conversations which occurred in Utah, New York, and Switzerland
during the latter half of 1989.
same facts.

Kaufmann1s defenses turn on the

In short, Kaufmann was either the principal in these
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business dealings who utilized agents in Utah to accomplish his
aims, (Akhavan), or he was an investment banker only peripherally
involved in representing clients holding investments in Republic
and therefore interested in Republic's business transactions in
Utah and elsewhere, (Kaufmann).
In denying Kaufmann's motion to dismiss, the lower court was
advised of the guidelines set forth in Anderson.

(R. 576-77).

Although it is not altogether clear that the court's order was
limited to a determination that Akhavan had only made a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction and that all disputes in the
documentary record were resolved in his favor as required at this
stage, the court was nevertheless bound not to weigh the evidence
until an evidentiary hearing had been held. Anderson, 807 P.2d at
827.
Since Kaufmann was effectively precluded as a matter of law
under Anderson from obtaining an evidentiary hearing on his
jurisdictional defenses until trial on the merits, it follows that
he was entitled to such a hearing on due process grounds before the
court entered its findings against him. Anderson, supra. See also
Kamdar & Co. v. LaRav Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991).
This circumstance should be given considerable weight in assessing
the reasonableness of the lower court's action.
C.

The Lower Court's Denial of a Continuance was
Unreasonable under the Particular Circumstances of this
Case.

In this case, the following facts support the trial court's
ruling:
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1.

Kaufmann was represented by competent counsel

since

November, 1990, and was aware of the July 7, 1992 trial date.

(R.

1036).
2.

The case was originally set for trial in March, 1992, but

was continued because of a scheduling conflict on the part of
Kaufmann's counsel.
3.

(R. 898; 1043).

Kaufmann's counsel filed a notice and motion for leave to

withdraw as counsel on June 17, 1992, just three weeks prior to the
second date set for trial.
4.

(R. 959-65; 1043).

The motion to withdraw was based on the grounds that

Kaufmann was either unable or unwilling to pay the legal fees due
and owing his trial counsel.
5.

(R. 960).

In his motion to withdraw, Kaufmannfs counsel represented

to the court that Kaufmann did not intend to have substitute
counsel enter an appearance and that the motion "is not filed with
the intent of seeking a delay of trial."
6.

(R. 961).

At the pretrial conference held on June 29, 1992, the

court required confirmation from Kaufmann that he did not intend to
appear.
7.

(R. 1028).
In response, Kaufmann personally advised the court by FAX

on July 1, 1992, that he was not prepared to go to trial until
September or October, 1992, for financial reasons, and because he
needed additional time to obtain new Utah counsel.
1016).
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(R. 1014;

8.

Akhavan's counsel objected to the proposed continuance on

the grounds that his client should not be burdened by a second
delay.

(R. 1000).

By contrast, the facts supporting Kaufmann!s motion include
the following:
1.

Kaufraann is a foreign, nonresident residing in Zurich,

Switzerland who consistently challenged the court's assertion of
specific personal jurisdiction over him.

(R. 49; 235; 517; 525-27;

545-55; 638).
2.

Although

Kaufmann

had been

represented

by

competent

counsel since November, 1990, his counsel moved to withdraw just
three weeks before the case was scheduled for trial.

(R. 959-65)

Prior to the motion to withdraw, Kaufmannfs local counsel

3.
relocated

her

practice

to

Phoenix,

Arizona,

thereby

Kaufmann without benefit of any "local" counsel in Utah.

leaving
(R. 931).

The record does not indicate that she took any further steps to
protect his interests.
The first motion for continuance was filed by Kaufmann1s

4.
Washington

D.C.

counsel

because

of

a

schedule, not at Kaufmann's insistence.

conflict

in

his

trial

(R. 898). The assertion

by Akhavan's counsel that "obviously Bloom was not being paid at
that time" (R. 1000-1001) was presumption on his part rather than
evidence and should be disregarded.
5.

Kaufmann's own response to the court indicated that he

strongly denied the allegations and was prepared to go to trial in
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September/October of 1992, at most, a two to three month delay.
(R. 1016).
6.

Kaufmann requested additional time in order to obtain new

counsel in Utah to defend his interests at trial.
7.

(R. 1016).

The record clearly indicates that the attorney-client

relationship between Kaufmann and his Washington D.C. counsel had
so completely broken down in terms of trust and communication by
July 1, 1992, that his counsel believed himself to be placed in a
conflict of interest situation with his own client.

(R. 1015;

1028-29).
8.

Kaufmann advised his new Utah counsel that:
"(a) he believes he has substantial and meritorious

defenses to all of the claims of the counterclaimant;
(b)

he genuinely desires to defend this action and is

willing to appear at trial;
(c)

he will take all necessary action to assist in the

preparation of the matter for trial and appear at trial;
(d)

he would like me to represent him and will make

adequate financial arrangements with me to represent him in
this matter, and
(e)

he and his present attorney have had serious and

substantial disagreements to the degree that he believes that
he cannot be adequately represented."
9.

(R. 987-88).

Based upon his limited review of the pleadings and his

conversations with Kaufmann, his new Utah counsel concluded and
represented by affidavit that "new counsel for Mr. Kaufmann cannot
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adequately be prepared for trial on July 7, 1992, based upon its
complexity and the detailed factual history associated with the
claims which are the subject of this action."
10.

(R. 988).

By contrast, Akhavan failed to demonstrate any specific

prejudice to his position occasioned by a two/three month delay
beyond being "burdened by these tactics to delay the trial again."
(R. 1000),

It should be noted that this assertion by Akhavan' s

counsel rather surprisingly assumes without any proof that the
first motion for continuance was a sham to delay the trial.
919-22).

(R.

It should be noted further that the combined maximum

additional time requested in both motions for continuance taken
together would have extended the trial date from March 1992 to
October 1992, a time period of seven months.
In balancing the opposing interests on this issue, appellant
submits that it was unreasonable for the lower court to deny the
motion when

it became

apparent

that

Kaufmann

could

not be

adequately represented at trial on July 7, 1992, and that his
substantial rights to contest and defend both jurisdictional and
liability issues would be severely prejudiced by the court's
decision.

It must be remembered that Kaufmann was trying to

resolve these problems at a great distance, within the context of
a different legal system, and without benefit of local counsel. By
contrast, Akhavan was a resident of Salt Lake County, had benefit
of local counsel, and failed to demonstrate any specific prejudice
beyond the burden of waiting an additional two to three months to
go to trial.
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Under Rule 40(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
lower court could have granted the motion and still preserved the
testimony of Akhavan and his witnesses at Akhavanfs request.

The

court could also have required Kaufmann to pay the costs occasioned
by such postponement under Rule 40(b).

None of these steps which

could have mitigated any prejudice to Akhavan was taken.
Kaufmann
continuance.

demonstrated

good

cause

for

his

requested

In view of his due process right to an evidentiary

hearing on the jurisdictional question coupled with application of
the legal principle that the court should examine a request for
continuance in light of the tradition that a party should be
afforded every opportunity to appear and defend at trial, the lower
court acted unreasonably in denying the motion.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ENTERING
DEFAULT

JUDGMENT AGAINST KAUFMANN, BECAUSE

ITS

RULING WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE PARTICULAR FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
In his motion for entry of default judgment against Kaufmann
which was served on July 1, 1992, Akhavan justified such action on
Kaufmann's failure to personally appear at the pretrial conference
on June 29 coupled with the statement of his withdrawing counsel
that Kaufmann was not going to retain new counsel or appear at
trial.

(R. 1004; 1009).

As noted above, Kaufmann was in the

process of obtaining new Utah counsel and seeking a continuance of
trial date (R. 1037).

Akhavan argued that Kaufmann should be
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sanctioned under Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), and (D) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure for failure to appear as provided in Rule 16(d).
(R,. 1004) . Although at the pretrial conference, Kaufmann's counsel
apparently was informed that if Kaufmann failed to appear at trial
a default judgment would be entered against him, no pretrial order
to that effect appears in the record.

(R. 1036).

In opposing the motion, Kaufmann's Washington D.C. counsel
argued that although Kaufmann had been absent from the pretrial
conference because of the distance involved, he was represented by
counsel in spite of the fact that counsel had filed a motion to
withdraw.

(R. 1019).

He then relayed Kaufmannfs request for a

continuance noting the communication and conflict of interest
problems between himself and his client.

(R. 1019-20).

Although in entering its default order and judgment the court
made no reference to Rule 16(d) or Rule 37(b)(2) in terms of
sanctions, the order clearly was of that nature since it was based
upon prior (oral) rulings "that if Kaufmann and his counsel failed
to appear for trial, a default judgment would be entered."

(R.

1051). Kaufmann and his counsel were aware of these rulings prior
to trial.

(R. 1036-37).

Because of the close connection between Kaufmannfs motion for
continuance and Akhavan's motion for entry of default judgment, the
same factors considered above in balancing the competing interests
of the parties are relevant here. In addition, however, this court
has observed that a default judgment is an unusually harsh remedy
that should be meted out with caution.
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Darrington v. Wade, 812

P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), See also, Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d
1375 (Utah 1977); Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp, v. Tolbert, 402
P.2d 703 (Utah 1965); Warner v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah
1953).
In this case, the record indicates that the attorney-client
relationship between Kaufmann and his Washington D.C. counsel had
deteriorated

to the point that he believed

he could not be

adequately represented; that he sought to retain new Utah counsel
who immediately moved for a continuance of trial date; that he
believes that he has substantial and genuine defenses to Akhavan's
claims; and th#t he genuinely desires to defend this action and
will take all necessary steps to appear at trial.

(R. 987-88).

He

also attempted to explain to the court by letter dispatched from
his home in Switzerland that he was unable to attend trial on July
7, 1992, because of financial difficulties.

(R. 1037).

In short, this is simply not a case of "willfulness, bad
faith, or fault" which justifies entry of default judgment as a
sanction against a noncomplying party.

See, Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.,

v. Schettlerr 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989).

On the contrary, the

record demonstrates that Kaufmann immediately responded to the
court's pretrial ruling of June 29, 1992, by retaining new counsel
and moving for £ continuance three days later.

(R. 979; 1036-37).

In addition, he attempted without benefit of counsel to demonstrate
his inability to appear on July 7, 1992, for financial reasons.
(R. 1037).

It should also be noted that the court did not rule on

Kaufmannfs motion for continuance until July 6, 1992, approximately
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twenty-four hours prior to trial, despite his motion for an
expedited hearing- (R. 983; 1043).
As indicated above, the reasonableness of the court's ruling
in this case must be viewed from the factual and legal context in
which it occurred.

Kaufraann was a foreign, nonresident defendant

living thousands of miles from the forum who had effectively lost
the adequate representation of his out-of-state counsel just prior
to trial.

He had previously challenged the court's personal

jurisdiction over him and was entitled under Utah law to an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.

He took immediate steps to

secure new Utah counsel and move for a continuance once he had been
advised of the court's pretrial rulings.

He was prejudiced by

entry of default judgment in that he was deprived of a full and
fair opportunity to present his case in court.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT KAUFMANN
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT!S JURISDICTION
IN THIS CASE, SINCE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD TO SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING.
After conducting a hearing in Kaufmann's absence, the lower
court entered the following Finding of Fact No. 1 and Conclusion of
Law No. 1 on the jurisdictional issue:
FINDING OF FACT NO. 1
"Kaufmann was properly served with process in this action and
by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's jurisdiction
over him. Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been represented by
39

competent counsel from the law firm of Metzer, Gordon, Scully &
Mortimer and Leslie Ann Haacke, as local counsel."
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1
"Kaufmann was properly served with process in this action and
by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's jurisdiction
over him. Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been represented by
competent counsel from the law firm of Metzger, Gordon, Scully &
Mortimer and Leslieann Haacke, as local counsel."
In attempting to marshall the evidence in favor of the court's
finding on this issue, counsel for appellant has been unable to
locate a single fact supporting it in the record or transcript of
hearing. The only possibility is a stipulation entered into early
in the case in which Akhavan agreed to the entry of an order
vacating a default certificate filed against Kaufmann before he was
represented by counsel in exchange for Kaufmannfs agreement to
waive his objections to certain defects in Akhavan1s attempted
service of process.

(R. 543).

But this stipulation expressly

states that Kaufmann has not waived any of his jurisdictional
defenses.

(R. 543).

In fact Kaufmann continued to raise those

defenses below until default judgment was entered against him. (R.
49; 235; 517; 525-27; 545-55; 638). All of the other stipulations
deal with routine extensions of time or continuances of hearings
without mention of any jurisdictional waiver.

(R. 659).

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be shown that
they lack adequate evidentiary foundation.

Western Capital &

Sees., Inc. v. Knudsviq, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
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779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989).

Conclusions of law are reviewed under a

correctness of error standard. Bailey v. Call, 7 67 P.2d 138 (Utah
App.)/ cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
Since the

strongest

case of

inadequate

or

insufficient

evidence is no evidence at all, this finding and conclusion are
both clearly erroneous and clearly wrong.
Kaufmann has been prejudiced by this finding and conclusion
since they are unsupported by any evidence whatever and purport to
justify the court's assertion of general personal jurisdiction over
him in a way which would preclude subsequent collateral attack.
Such a result is both contrary to law and fundamental fairness and
should be reversed on this appeal.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES IN THIS CASE, SINCE IT AFFORDED AKHAVAN A
DOUBLE RECOVERY.
In Utah, recoverable damages for breach of contract include
both general or compensatory damages, i.e.f those flowing naturally
from the breach, and consequential damages, i.e. , those reasonably
within the contemplation of or reasonably foreseeable by the
parties at the time the contract was made.

Beck v. Farmers Ins.

Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 379, 325 P.2d
906, 907 (1958), citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.
Rep. 145 (1854),

Recoverable damages for fraud are based upon the

"benefit of the bargain" rule. Lamb v. Bancrart, 525 P.2d 602, 607
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(Utah 1974).

In either event, the trial court's award of damages

will be affirmed on appeal if there is a "reasonable basis in
evidence" to support it. Katzenberger v. State, 735 P. 2d 405 (Utah
App. 1987), citing Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah
1976).
In this case, the lower court specifically found that the
terms of the contract included the following:
a.

Purchase price of $300,000 for Akhavan's equity interest

in General Display;
b.

A covenant by Akhavan not to compete for a period of two

years;
c.

An agreement to pay Akhavan 25% of the net proceeds from

any judgment or settlement of a pending lawsuit against the Walt
Disney Company; and
d.

Attorney's

litigation.

fees payable to the prevailing party in

(Finding of Fact No. 9,.R. 1045).

Following the hearing, the court found that Akhavan was
entitled to recover damages as follows:
a.

$250,000 for the difference between the contract price

and current value of General Display.

(Since $50,000 had already

been paid, the total amount recovered equaled the contract price of
$300,000-);
b.

$168,000 under the covenant not to compete for 2 years;

c.

$43,250 which was 25% of the $173,000 settlement of the

Walt Disney suit;
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-

suit.

$44,212-50 for attorney's fees and $3,006.59 for costs of
(Finding of Fact No. 17, R. 1047).

The court's related Conclusion of Law on damages reads as
follows:
"Kaufmann, in connection with negotiations for executing the
contract with Akhavan, made certain representations to Akhavan
which Kaufmanri knew to be false and upon which Akhavan relied upon
entering into the contract with Kaufmann. Kaufmann's breaches and
misrepresentations have caused Akhavan to suffer damages in the
amount set forth in Exhibit 3.

Akhavan is entitled to judgment

against Kaufitiann in the amount of

$553,563.53

and

costs of

$3,006.59. (Conclusion of Law No. 7, R. 1048).
Although

it

is

not

altogether

clear

from

the

court's

Conclusion of Law No. 7 whether damages are being awarded for
breach of contract, fraud, or both together, Kaufmann submits that
the award was contrary to law in all events, since it permitted
Akhavan to re^p

a

double recovery.

Even though recovery for breach of contract may include both
compensatory $nd consequential damages, and may provide plaintiff
the full benefit of the bargain in fraud, a party's damages are
nevertheless limited in either case by the rule which prohibits a
doable

recovei:y.

rn contract cases, for example, it is well

settled that a n obligee is entitled to be paid in full but cannot
exact double recovery. Cook Assoc, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161
(Utah 1983), citing Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery Center,
Inc., 613 P.2d 510, 511-12 (Utah 1980).
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In fraud cases, a double

recovery is contrary to the benefit of the bargain rule. Brown v.
Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992).
In this case, Kaufmann submits that the agreed upon price for
the business necessarily included the value of Akhavanfs covenant
not to compete, since it was not valued separately as was the 25%
interest in the Disney suit.

(Agreement, Addendum F, R. 287-90).

See also, Rudd v. Parks, 588 P.2d 709 (Utah 1978) (awarding damages
for a covenant not to compete which was separately valued as part
of the total purchase price).

Had Akhavan elected to violate the

covenant, he would have been liable for damages which properly
would have been treated as an offset against the amount owing for
the purchase price.

In short, had Akhavan been paid the full

purchase price of $300,000, he would have had no action for breach
of contract or fraud, and would have received the full benefit of
the bargain.

By allowing him to recover the full amount of the

purchase price in compensatory damages, plus the alleged value of
his covenant not to compete, the court permitted him to exact a
double recovery in contravention of law.
CONCLUSION
Roland Kaufmann was denied a full and fair opportunity to
appear and defend at trial by the court's adverse rulings in this
case.

He was prejudiced at the entry of default judgment against

him based upon a jurisdictional finding which lacks any basis
whatsoever in the evidence.

He was further prejudiced by an

excessive award of damages which is contrary to law. For these and
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the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court should be
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
DATED this

3 ^ / day of March, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES

By
Paul M. Durham, Esq.
G. Richard Hill, Esq.
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
Roland Kaufmann
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APPENDIX

Tab A

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

TabB

78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim
arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendent had
no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 3; 1983, ch.
160, § 1; 1987, ch. 35, § 1.

TabC

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Hales, 656 P.2d 423 (Utah 1982); Alpine Credit
Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988 (Utah 1982);
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676
P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); Bushnell Real Estate,
Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983); Call
v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah
1986); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 746

Rule 16

P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Oates v.
Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988); Galloway v.
Afco Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785
P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Wanlass v. D
Land Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger, 793 P.2d 393
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Sneddon v. Graham, 175
Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 289 to 295, 306 et seq., 329 to 331.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 275 to 338.
A.L.R. — Right to amend pending personal
injury action by including action for wrongful
death after statute of limitations has run
against independent death action, 71 A.L.R.3d
933.
Amendment of pleading after limitation has
run, so as to set up subsequent appointment as
executor or administrator of plaintiff who professed to bring the action in that capacity without previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th
198.
Amendment of pleading to add, substitute,
or change capacity of, party plaintiff as relating back to date of original pleading, under
Rule 15(c) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

so as to avoid bar of limitations, 12 A.L.R. Fed.
233.
What constitutes "prejudice" to party who
objects to evidence outside issues made by
pleadings so as to preclude amendment of
pleadings under Rule 15(b) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 448.
Construction and application of Rule 15(d) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing for
allowance of supplemental pleadings setting
forth transactions, occurrences, or events subsequent to original pleading, 28 A.L.R. Fed.
129.
Rule 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
or state law as governing relation back of
amended pleading, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 880.
Key Numbers. — Pleading «=» 229 to 286.

Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management conferences.
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon
motion of a party, may direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial
for such purposes as:
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not
be protracted for lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the orderly disposition of
the case.
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. In any action, in addition
to any pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion
may direct that a scheduling or management conference be held. The court
may direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before the court.
Scheduling or management conferences may also be held by way of telephone
conferencing between the court and counsel as the particular case may require. Decisions and agreements reached at scheduling and management conferences may be formally made an order of the court. At the conference, the
court may consider the following matters:
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(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses;
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional parties or amendment of pleadings;
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery;
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions;
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance rulings from the court on admissibility of
evidence;
(6) the identification of witnesses and documents, the need for and
schedule for filing and exchanging trial briefs, and the dates for a final
pretrial and scheduling conference and for a trial;
(7) the advisability of referring matters to a lower court that has appropriate jurisdiction to hear the case;
(8) the possibility of settlement;
(9) the need for adopting special procedures for managing particularly
difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple
parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems;
(10) the form and substance of a pretrial order, if it is determined that
a formal pretrial order is necessary in the particular case; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the case.
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any action where a final
pretrial conference has been ordered, it shall be held as close to the time of
trial as reasonable under the circumstances. The conference shall be attended
by at least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the
parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless waived by the court,
shall have available, either in person or by telephone, the appropriate parties
who have authority to make binding decisions regarding settlement.
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or
pretrial conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails
to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may
make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of
the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any
other sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney representing
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Pretrial conference.
—Purpose.
Amendments to pleadings.
Disputed issues of law.
Pretrial order.
—Amendment.

Conformance to evidence.
Good cause.
Not allowed.
Opportunity to meet issue.
—Conclusiveness.
—Effect.
Control of issues.
—Failure to comply.
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their authenticity, to accept a copy of defendant's written admissions served upon plaintiff
as compliance with the rules; where the trial
court chose the latter option, it was proper to
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admissions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v.
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982).
—Failure to respond.
Objectionable matter.
Even if a request for an admission is objectionable, if a party fails to object and fails to
respond to the request, then that party should
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v.
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah
1985).
Prison inmate.
When inmate served requests for admissions
and interrogatories on prison officials in action
for recovery of value of personal property taken
from him, on failure of officials to respond to
the requests, apply for extension of time, or
move to amend or withdraw their admissions
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were

deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v.
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
—Motion to dismiss.
Tolling.
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for admissions which are not answered within 45
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979).
—Punitive damages.
Where plaintiff requests an admission of punitive damages in an amount unrelated to actual damages, the court, as a matter of equity,
must intervene and examine the admission.
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98
(Utah 1985).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151,
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner,
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734
(Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325.
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110.
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure testimony of absent witness in civil case, admissions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and
rules, to respond to request for admission of

facts not within his personal knowledge, 20
A.L.R.3d 756.
Formal sufficiency of response to request for
admissions under state discovery rules, 8
A.L.R.4th 728.
Permissible scope, respecting nature of inquiry, of demand for admissions under modern
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489.
Key Numbers. — Discovery «=> 121 to 129.

Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions,
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
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with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner,
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. II a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a^ contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
107

Rule 37

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, t;he court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-32-1 et seq.
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a jury trial was made, or that any objection or
exception was made at any time during trial
against right of the court to try the case without a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that
a trial by jury was waived Perego v Dodge, 9
Utah 3, 33 P 221 (1893), affd, 163 U S 160,16
S Ct 971, 41 L Ed 113 (1896)
Trial by jury.
Grant of jury trial.

Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced
thereby James Mfg Co v Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
210, 390 P 2d 127 (1964)
—Right.
. fif, Q . _
n
"~^Qme
^
vf • u
This rule gives the right to have any legal
issue of fact tried by a jury upon proper demand, and plaintiff m an action to quiet title to
mining claims was entitled to a jury trial on
l s s u e s o f f a c t Holland v Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11,
327 p 2d 250 (1958)

——Absence of demand.
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting
jury trial to defendant, under this rule, over
plaintiffs objections although defendant had
Cited in Randall v Tracy Collins Trust Co ,
not made proper demand for jury trial under 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P 2d 480 (1956)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d — 47 Am Jur 2d Jury §§ 57,
58, 75A Am Jur 2d Trial § 714 et seq
C.J.S. — 50 C J S Juries §§ 98 to 105, 88
C J S Trial §§ 20, 203, 547 et seq
A.L.R. — When does jeopardy attach in a
non-jury trial, 49 A L R 3d 1039
Discretion of district court under Rule 39(b)

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authonzmg it to order jury trial notwithstanding
party's failure to make seasonable demand for
j u r y , 6 A L R Fed 217
Key Numbers. — Jury <&=> 25, Trial <s=» 10,
x34> 357 e t s e q

Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such
other manner as the courts may deem expedient Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may m
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon
good cause shown If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to
procure it The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the adverse
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have
the testimony of any witness present taken, m the same manner as if at the
trial, and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and
(B)].
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amendment of Rule 32, effective January 1, 1987, the
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule
32(c)(3)(A) and (B)

Subdivision (a) of this rule is similar to Rule
40, F R C P
Cross-References. — Amendment of pleadmgs to conform to evidence, continuance upon,
Rule 15(b)
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ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
TELEPHONE HO 1/521 •",()()()
TELEFAX 801/:|5!)2H:1<>
Member of I IK; California liar
No( admitted in the State of I Hah

C>nH5 UNION I'ARK CENTER
S U I T E r,:)r>
MinVALE. UTAH S-UM7

October 19, 1989

Sia Akhavan
643 17th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
RE:

Memorandum of Oral Agreement by and Between Robert D. Radcliffe
and Sia Akhavan RE: General Display Corporation

Dear Sin:
This letter constitutes a written memorandum of oral agreement by and between
Robert D. Radcliffe (herein "RADCLIFFE"), the undersigned, and Mr. Sia Akhavan
(herein "AKHAVAN") concerning RADCLIFFE's purchase of AKHAVAN's ownership
interest in General Display Corporation (hereinafter S>GDCN), which may or may not
include shares of common stock. The agreement contains the following terms and
conditions:
'•

SALE AND PURCHASE OF STOCK OR OTHER INTERESTS.
RADCLIFFE hereby agrees to purchase from AKHAVAN all of
AKHAVAN's shares of common stock, or all of his right, title and
interest in and to GDC which, at closing, shall constitute 50% equity
interest in said company.

2.

PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for said shares of stock or
equity interest shall total Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000).

3.

ADDITIONAL PURCHASE BONUS: In the event the net earnings of
GDC equal or exceed ten percent (10%) of invested capital at the end of
twenty-four (24) months after close of escrow, then AKHAVAN shall be
paid an additional purchase bonus of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars
($200,000) payable in cash. "Net Earnings" and "invested capital" shall
be defined and me amount determined by GDC ?»ndi\OTs and sh?A\ appty
to the latest twelve (12) month reporting period covered by the normal
company audit reporting period.

4.

PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price shall be paid by
the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) at the closing of the
purchase transaction, and a secured promissory note in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) payable in eighteen (18)
equal monthly installments of principal, plus accrued interest on the
unpaid balance at the rate of 10% per annum. The first payment shall
commence 60 days from the close of escrow.
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5.

SECURITY FOR PROMISSORY NOTE. As security for the payment of
the Promissory Note described above, RADCLIFFE agrees to pledge Five
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000) worth of issued and outstanding
Republic International Corporation stock owned by RADCLIFFE with its
value being determined by the slocks7 price on the over-the-counter
market on the date of closing. Every six months following execution of
the definite agreement contemplated herein, and until the Promissory
Note is fully paid, the value of RADCLIFFE's stock shall be reassessed,
and should its value decline, sufficient numbers of shares shall be
deposited with the escrow agent to cure said deficiency, PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, RADCLIFFE shall not be required to maintain the value of
the pledged stock hereunder in excess of double the then outstanding
balance of the Promissory Note.

6.

ESCROW FOR PLEDGED SECURITIES. The definitive agreement
contemplated herein shall establish an escrow at the law offices of Kruse,
Landa & Maycock, c/o Jim Kruse, Eighth Floor, Valley Tower, 50 West
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, upon terms and conditions
established by Kruse, Landa & Maycock and mutually approved by
RADCLIFFE and AKHAVAN.

7.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES BY AKHAVAN. AKHAVAN
represents and warrants to RADCLIFFE as follows:
a.

That he owns the subject interests to be purchased hereunder and
that they are not encumbered in any manner.

b.

That GDC is a corporation in good standing under the laws of the
Stale of Utah and that he has the requisite authority thereunder
to sell the shares to RADCLIFFE.
all financial statements and sjmilgjLS&prt
suniia£--£
or tcuafty^niirdparty have been prepared
RADCEITTE-pTC^
by GDC under^JCHAVT^?^
and, to the
best^Jris^lcnowledge, they are true and corr

Xi.

Si of his knowledge, while acting
GDC, he caused ail tax^Jli&w? b^S^&raTI^d^siatP^
been fl

to have

That he has or will disclose to RADCLIFFE all contracts, leases,
agreements, joint ventures, licenses, financing arrangements,
permits, and any other binding arrangement known to him which
would have a material effect on this transaction and the operation
of GDC.
That to the best of his knowledge GDC has good and marketable
dtf\£~
title to all of its property, froo and clear of all lioTO/^ft^tga-gfrs, r ^ W
.pledgor ftncmnbrancae, proprietary inl:erc3tey^nd/QiLchai^es-Qf-al4>
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>usiness of GDC and curr^ru^^
patents!
inventions, jra^e^@cretS7i<iTOW-hdw and ^ifidential.informatioif^olated4o4^e business-of^EXj. Furthermore, that all
such proprietary and intangible rights have been securedby GDC
by appropriate protective measures and that there are no known
disclosures or publications of said information to third parties.
Moreover, that there are no known claims by third parties,
including employees or agents, for any equitable interest in said
proprietary rights.
g.

That, to the best of his knowledge, there are no actions, suils,
proceedings, arbitrations or litigation of any kind pending or
threatened against GDC or its business or assets except for that
certain lawsuit entitled General Display Corporation v. The Walt
Disney Company, Civil No. 89-C-892-I, presently pending, in thpj
United States District Court for the District of Utah/TAKHAVAN
specifically warrants and represents that this particular lawsuit is
an asset of GDC and that he has no interest in it whatsoever. In
the event GDC prosecutes this claim, GDC shall pay AKHAVAN
twenty-five percent (25%) of the net proceeds after all costs of
litigation, including attorneys7 fees, from settlement or judgment.

CLOSING PROCEDURES. The closing of this transaction is therefore
contemplated to take place on Friday, October 20, 1989, at the offices of
ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE, 6985 Union Park Center, Suite 535, Midvale,
Utah, or at such other date and time as may be mutually agreeable in
writing between the parties hereto.
INDEMNIFICATION. Immediately upon the close of this transaction, #
RADCLIFFE shall convene a shareholders' meeting and vote his shares '
to approve the indemnification of AKHAVAN by the corporation from
and against any debts and obligations of the corporation which have
been disclosed to RADCLIFFE. This contemplated indemnification shall
include any GDC obligations as to equipment, real property, loans, notes,
accounts payable and specifically the presently pending assessment for
unpaid withholding taxes asserted by the Internal Revenue Service.
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. Subsequent to the consummation of
this transaction and the termination of AKHAVAN's employment by
GDC, whichever occurs first, AKHAVAN agrees not to establish without
prior written approval any firm or corporation, or enter into any
employment, or to provide any services whatsoever to third parties
which would be competitive in any manner with the business of GDC,
including but not limited to, soliciting any business whatsoever from
GDC's existing customers as set forth in Exhibit A hereto. This covenant
not to compete shall terminate two years after the close of escrow
hereunder. This covenant not to compete shall have no territorial limits
with regard to the persons or entities disclosed on Exhibit A, however
shall be limited to the states of Utah, Arizona, Nevada, California,
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Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana and Colorado as to all other
persons or entities.
11.

DISPUTES. Any dispute which might arise under the terms of this
agreement shall be resolved under the laws of the State of Utah and any
lawsuit arising out of this agreement shall be instituted in a state or
federal court in the State of Utah. The'prevailing party in any such suit
shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

12.

ASSIGNMENT. RADCLIFFE may assign his rights and obligations under
this agreement with the prior written approval of AKHAVAN.
Reasonable approval shall not be withheld so long as AKHAVAN retains
the security set forth in paragraph 4 herein.

13.

INVESTMENT REPRESENTATION. RADCLIFFE understands that the
shares of GDC stock have not been registered and that they are being
offered for sale pursuant to an exemption from registration under the
Securities Act of 1933; that there is no assurance that the exemption is
available; that the shares will be subject to statutory restrictions on resale;
and that the shares will be delivered with restrictive provisions imprinted
thereon.
RADCLIFFE represents that he has such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he has made an informed investment
decision and that he is purchasing this investment as an investment
without the present intent to dispose of it by resale other than as
lepresented in paragraph 12 herein. In the event RADCLIFFE assigns
his right to purchase to another person or entity pursuant to paragraph
12, then said party shall execute this paragraph upon transfer.

Please sign in the space provided below indicating vour acceptanc

BY:
"Robert D. Radcliffe

AGREED AND ACCEPTED THIS

.2?

day of /

BY.

/ T

^

, 1989

_ ^ _
Sia Akhavan
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF UTAHf COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE
Plaintiff,
vs.
SIA AKHAVAN, JOEL M.
LASALLE ET. AL.
Defendants.

Case No. 900900439
920541-CA

Supplemental transcript of proceedings

Proceedings before the Honorable
Judge James S. Sawaya
On July 7, 1992

Cathy Gallegos
Certified Shorthand Reporter
License No. 177
2901 West Bedford Rd.
West Valley City, Utah 84119

2

July 7, 1992
MR. HOLBROOK:

First witness we would call would

be Sia Akhavan.
THE COURT:

Come forward and be sworn.
SIA AHKAVAN

Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn
was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOLBROOK:
Q

I will try to make this as brief as possible.

Could you please state your name and address for the
record, please?
A

Sia Akhavan, residing at 643 17th Avenue, Salt

Lake City, Utah 84101.
Q

Are you currently a United States citizen?

A

I am and have been for seven years.

Q

When did you first come to the United States?

A

1981.

Q

You have been here for approximately eleven

years?
A

That is correct.

Q

Could you briefly describe your work experience

when you arrived in the United States, commercial sign
business?

3

A

When I first came to the United States, I

proceeded to purchase Electronic Message Center and sell
advertising on them.

A year after that, I had proceeded to

manufacture them and have been in the business of
manufacturing signs since then.
Q

Did there come a time when you obtained an

ownership interest in a sign company called General
Display?
A

That is correct.

That was in 1987.

Q

Did there also come a time when you learned

someone was interested in buying your interest in General
Display?
A

September 1989.

Q

Who did you learn that from?

A

From Joel LaSalle.

Q

What did he tell you?

A

He told me that Mr. Kaufman was interested in

purchasing my interest in General Display, for the purpose
of putting or merging it with a publicly-held company.
Q

Did he set up a meeting with Kaufman to discuss

the purchase?
A

He did.

Q

And describe that meeting?

A

The meeting took place at his offices in Salt

Lake City with two of his agents, Mr. Radcliffe and also

4

Mr. Manual Floor.
Q

Approximately when that was meeting?

A

Early October 1989.

Q

What did you discuss in this meeting?

A

We discussed Mr. Radcliffe—I mean Mr. Kaufman's

interest in purchasing my interest in General Display for
the purposes of merging it with the public-held company.
We also discussed prices.
Q

Did you reach an ultimate resolution as to what

price Kaufman was willing to pay for your interest in
General Display?
A

We did.

Q

Did you agree on any terms on how that price

would be paid?
A

No.

The terms were to be negotiated over the

next few days.
Q

Did they tell you why Kaufman wanted to purchase

your company?
A

They explained that he had made a commencement

to a company called F. N. Wolf.

He desperately needed my

company to merge with that publicly-held company.
Q

Did you ever meet again with Radcliffe and Floor

to discuss the terms of the purchase price?
A

We did but we didn't come to any terms.

Q

So what happened after that?

5

A

Mr. Kaufman called me from Switzerland and he

informed me that he was flying to Salt Lake to work out the
conditions of the purchase.
an agreement.

He assured me we would come to

I wouldn't have any further problems,

Q

Did he come to Salt Lake City?

A

He did very shortly after that.

Q

Met with him to negotiate these terms?

A

I did at his request.

Q

Please describe that meeting.

A

The meeting took place in his offices in Fort

Union Boulevard, and we sat across the table and we
negotiated the terms and conditions of the sale with him.
Q
one.

Let me hand you what's been marked plaintiff's
Can you identify that document?

A

Yes.

Q

Can you describe that document?

A

It's an agreement under which I sold my interest

in General Display to Mr. Kaufman.
Q

Does this contain the terms that you and Mr.

Kaufman agreed to at that meeting you previously described?
A

It does.

Q

Okay.

meeting was over?

Can you tell us what happened after the
After you reached an agreement with

respect to the terms, what happened?
A

Mr. Kaufman called Mr. Radcliffe into the room

6

and he asked Mr. Radcliffe —
terms we had settled on.

told Mr. Radcliffe about the

And he told him to go ahead and

draft the document, and he told him to go ahead and sign
the document on his behalf and purchase the stock in his
behalf.
Q

Is exhibit 1 the document that was drafted by

Radcliffe pursuant to Mr. Kaufman's instructions?
A

It is.

Q

Does it contain the signatures of you and

Radcliffe?
A

It does.

Q

We would ask for admission of exhibit 1.
THE COURT:

It may be admitted.

What was Mr.

Radcliffe 1 s interest in this agreement?
A

He was the agent of Mr. Kaufman.

As an

attorney, he was acting on his behalf.
MR. HOLBROOK:

I have an extra copy, if Your

Honor would like.
THE COURT:

I would appreciate it.

MR. HOLBROOK:
Q

All right.

Mr. Akhavan, if you would look at page one on

paragraph fourf it states the fifty thousand dollars would
be paid as an initial payment of the purchase price.
you see that?
A

I do.

Do
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Q

Was that fifty thousand dollars paid by Kaufman?

A

It was paid by Mr. Kaufman.

Q

How do you know that?

A

I received the check and I proceeded to cash the

check and they told me there wasn't sufficient funds.

I

called Mr. Kaufman's office, his secretary Carol, told me
that that was impossible, that Mr. Kaufman had sent the
money and she told me to go ahead and take a trip down.
the time I get there, she would have it resolved.

By

When I

went down there, she smiled and said that Kaufman had sent
the money into the wrong account and she just had to make
the transfer.
bank.

And she told me to go ahead and go to the

I proceeded to go to the bank and cashed the check

at that time.
Q

She had told that you Kaufman had wired the

money over from Switzerland into the wrong account or that
she would transfer it into the proper account so you could
cash the check?
A

That is correct.

Q

Paragraph four calls for payment of two hundred

fifty thousand dollars over eighteen months.
that provision?
A

I do.

Q

Was that money ever paid to you?

A

It was not.

Do you see
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Q

When the first installment of that money was not

paid, what actions did you undertake to try to collect
that?
A

I proceeded to call Mr. Kaufman in Switzerland.

After many conversations with, I believe, his secretary,
she told me that Mr. Kaufman was to be in Salt Lake City
shortly after that.
THE COURT:

So I

—

Let me interrupt.

of what is going on here.

I should be aware

I have had this case on my desk

many times, but the agreement is between Radcliffe and
Akhavan.

How does Kaufman become involved i n —
MR. HOLBROOK:

Radcliffe, that's what I am trying

to establish.
THE COURT:

He was an agent?

MR. HOLBROOK:
THE COURT:

Acting as an agent.

There's nothing in this agreement

speaking of a principal/agency relationship.

The agreement

is between Mr. Akhavan and Mr. Radcliffe.
MR. HOLBROOK:
that the agreement —

Right.

But it is our contention

we have two claims, one that

Radcliffe was acting as his agent, for Mr. Kaufman, and all
the negotiations took place between Kaufman and Akhavan
with respect to it.

When there was a default, Akhavan

contacted Kaufman and Kaufman assured he would be paid.
The two grounds, one, breach of contract, Radcliffe was
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merely acting as agent for Kaufman,

Two, Kaufman was

either fraudulent or misrepresented all these facts in
causing Akhavan to execute this agreement.
You may continue.

You were describing when you

didn't receive payment, you contacted Mr. Kaufman, he was
on his way to Salt Lake City?
A

I called his office in Salt Lake City and went

and met with him.

He assured me that it was only the

problem of the banks, and he had wired three months of the
payments to Salt Lake City, that I was to be receiving it
very shortly after.
Q

When you contacted Kaufman to make these

payments of two hundred fifty thousand dollars under the
contract, did Kaufman ever say, "This is not my contract
you need to look to Radcliffe for payments"?
A

Not at all.

Mr. Kaufman, on other occasions,

had confirmed that was the contract with him and that he
was very interested in the meeting we had in a club called
the New Yorker here in town.

He confirmed and thanked me

for selling him my stock and how it would help him in being
able to put this in a publicly-held vehicle.
Q

At any time did Kaufman say, "Radcliffe is the

one that needs to pay this money and I am not obligated?"
A

No.

Q

Did Kaufman in fact represent to you that he was
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having his money transferred over from Switzerland so he
would make the three payments under this agreement to bring
it current?
A

That is correct*

Q

As a result of Kaufman's actions and

misrepresentations, have you suffered damages as a result
of this breach of contract?
A

I have.

Q

All right.

First of all, in looking at

paragraph four at the two hundred fifty thousand dollars
let me step back.

The initial sales price under the

contract was for three hundred thousand dollars; is that
correct?
A

That is correct, with a bonus, additional

purchase bonus.
Q

All right, of the three hundred thousand

dollars, you were paid fifty thousand dollars?
A

That is correct.

Q

So you have not been paid two hundred fifty

thousand dollars?
A

That is correct.

Q

All right.

If you look on page three under

paragraph ten, there's a covenant not to compete.

What

does that covenant prevent you from doing?
A

From engaging in any employment related to the

—
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manufacturing, or selling signs, which was my area of
expertise.
Q

In fact, you had been engaged in the sign

business since you arrived in the United States?
A

That is correct.

Q

You owned the sign company?

You were an officer

of that sign company?
A

That is correct.

Q

When you left General Display, what was your

monthly salary?
A

Ten thousand dollars.

Q

If you were able to compete under this contract

and either form a new sign company, or go to work for a
competing sign company, what would you estimate your salary
would have been?
A

I would estimate it to be more than that,

because of my experience.
Q

More than ten thousand dollars?

A

That is correct.

Q

All right.

A

That is correct.

Q

Why didn't you compete?

A

Because I honored my commitment.

But you did not compete?

I have made a

commitment, based on this contract not to compete.
Q

Did you seek alternative employment during that
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two year period?
A

I did.

Q

What types of employment, jobs did you seek?

A

Production management.

Q

Of manufacturing plants?

A

Manufacturing plants.

Q

That was your forte in the sign industry

production management of signs?
A

Among other things.

Q

Did you ever take another job?

A

I did not.

Q

Were any jobs offered to you?

A

They were not.

Q

When you were interviewing, what was the most

monthly income that you had been —

that was available in

production management?
A

The highest job I applied for was for two

thousand dollars a month.
Q

I would like to focus on page three paragraph

7(G) where it refers to a lawsuit entitled General Display
vs. the Walt Disney Company.

Under that provision, it says

you are entitled to receive twenty-five percent of any of
the net proceeds from that lawsuit?
A

Correct.

Q

Just briefly describe how that came about and
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how Mr. Kaufman had agreed to that.
A

At the time I was controlling and managing

General Display, I brought a suit against Walt Disney for
using one of our designs and I was sure that I was right,
so I was insisting that —
sell my company.

In other words, I wanted to keep a

portion of that asset.
to agree to it.

I needed a portion of that to

It took a long time for Mr. Kaufman

As a matter of fact, he went to the

offices of Burbidge and Mitchell, who were handling the
case, and he discussed it with them and looked at the
complaint and everything else.

And he was accompanied with

his attorney, Robert Radcliffe, at the time and I
understand that they got —

contacted the Walt Disney

company before they made up their mind.

Finally, they

decided that they would allow me to keep twenty-five
percent.
Q

Was that lawsuit resolved?

A

It was resolved.

Q

All right.

Do you know what the net proceeds

were from that lawsuit?
A

I believe the agreement called for a

confidentiality.

But from my involvement with the IRS at

the time, I know that the IRS levied all the net proceeds
which were a hundred seventy-three thousand dollars.
Q

And you were involved with the IRS because you
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were personally liable for a portion of General Display's
tax liability?
A

That is correct.

Q

So after they had settled the lawsuit and the

IRS had levied the proceeds, you became aware that the IRS
had levied a hundred seventy-three thousand dollars?
A

That is correct.

Q

Turn to page four paragraph eleven, please.

Under that provision, it calls for the prevailing party of
the lawsuit to pay or to collect attorneys fees from the
other party.

Do you see that?

A

Yes.

Q

Tell me how that provision came about?

A

It was the suggestion of Mr. Kaufman and I

agreed to it.
Q

So Kaufman had insisted upon the attorneys fees

provision in the contract?
A

That is correct.

Q

Let me show you what * s been marked as

plaintiff's exhibit two.

Can you identify plaintiff's

exhibit two?
A

Yes.

These are my attorneys fees from year

1990, '91 and '92.
Q

They relate directly to this lawsuit?

A

They do.
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Q

All right, have you undertaken to calculate and

prepare a summary of those attorneys fees?

A

I have.

Q

What is that final calculation for the three

year's attorneys fees?
A

Forty-four thousand two hundred twelve dollars

and fifty cents.
THE COURT:

Does this relate solely to the

defense's treatment of this claim or defense of Radcliffe
claim

—
MR. HOLBROOK:

I will put evidence on.

In filing

this lawsuit, if you had filed this lawsuit as a claim
solely against Mr. Kaufman, prosecuted against Mr. Kaufman,
would you have to undertake—would your attorneys have to
undertake the same amount of discovery with respect to
taking the depositions of Mr. Floor, Mr. Radcliffe,
yourself, Jay Hansen?
A

It would be almost identical.

It would be

identical.
Q

So, in essence, in defending the Radcliffe

claim, if you prosecuted claims against all the defendants,
is roughly the same amount of discovery involved in each
case?
A

It is.

Q

Let me show you what's been marked as
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plaintiff's exhibit three.
THE COURT:

Can you identify this document

plaintiff's exhibit three?
A

Yes.
MR. HOLBROOK:

A

What is it?

It's a summary of the economic damages that I

suffered.
Q

Let's go over it briefly.

I have number one as

the contract amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars?
A

That's the contract balance of two hundred

fifty.
Q

All right, and there's also an interest

paragraph four, ten percent; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

Under that you have subparagraph A which relates

to interest only on the installment payments as they become
due over eighteen months; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

And then the interest from the day of those

installments to the present; is that correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

On Roman Numeral II, damages relate to your

covenant not to compete for two years?
A

That is right.

Q

Your salary while you were an officer, ten
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thousand dollars a month?
A

That is correct.

Q

Your business officer of employment, three

thousand dollars a month, for a net difference of seven
thousand dollars a month?
A

That is correct.

Q

And I think three is General Display, Walt

Disney proceeds hundred seventy-three thousand dollars?
A

Yes.

Q

Your entitlement to twenty-five percent interest

in that?
A

That is correct.

Q

Item four is the attorneys fees that you have

expended in this matter?
A

That is correct.

Q

And for a total damages of five hundred

fifty-three thousand five hundred sixty-three dollars and
fifty-three cents?
A

Correct.

Q

Item five, which we have not discussed before,

the costs that you have incurred in this suit uuder Rule
54, you are entitled to recover certain costs in reviewing
the financial —

The attorney billing statements on exhibit

two, have you generated and listed those costs which you
think you are reasonably entitled to under that?
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A

Yes.

Q

Is that a correct description of those costs?

A

Correct..

Q

We would ask that exhibits two and three be

admitted into evidence, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

They are admitted.

MR. HOLBROOK:

That's all the testimony I have

for Mr. Akhavan.
THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. HOLBROOK:

I would like to call Eric

Patterson to the stand.
DAVID ERIC PATTERSON
called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOLBROOK:
Q

Mr. Patterson, could you state your name and

address for the record, please?
A

My name is David Eric Patterson.

I live at 1580

Northeast Hills Drive in Bountiful Utah.
Q

Could you give us a brief background of your

work experience in the electronics industry?
A

Sure.

I have been working as an electronics

engineer, consultant and been an electronic technician for
twelve years now.
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Q

Did there come a time when you did electronic

work for General Display?
A

I worked first as a consultant.

Then I was an

employee of General Display.
Q

Roughly in the end of 1986 until the beginning

of 1990?
A

That is correct.

Q

Did there come a time when Joel LaSalle,

president of General Display, made an announcement that
Roland Kaufman was going to purchase Sia Akhavan's interest
in General Display?
A

Yes.

Q

Could you describe the events surrounding that?

A

Mr. LaSalle who's the presiding officer of

General Display at the time called a meeting for all
employees, which included myself among many
others—proceeded to announce Mr. Akhavan was present and
he proceeded to announce that Mr. Akhavan was selling his
shares of the company to Mr. Kaufman and that Mr. Kaufman
was going to institute many other things along with taking
over Mr. Akhavan's ownership interest in the company.
Q

Did that include fees and capital to help

General Display's current financial
A

—

That was mentioned specifically because it was

very important to the employees, and there were several

20

questions asked about that.
Q

Was Mr. Kaufman present at this meeting?

A

That is correct.

Q

Did Mr. Kaufman at any time confirm LaSalle's

statement that he was purchasing Akhavan interest in
General Display?
A

After several minutes of speaking by Mr.

LaSalle, Mr. Kaufman took several minutes, indicated that
he was happy for the opportunity of purchasing Mr.
Akhavan 1 s shares, had complimented Akhavan on the job he
had done bringing the company up to that point, and he was
looking forward to working with the company in
proceeding—trying to help the company grow and such.
Q

I have nothing further of this witness.
THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. HOLBROOK:

We would call Michael Beck.
MICHAEL BECK

Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn was
examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. HOLBROOK:
Q

Would you please state your name and address for

the record.
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A

Michael V. Beck 884 North 140 West, American

Fork.
Q

Could you give a brief description of your

educational background?
A

Yes.

And I have bachelor's degree in accounting

from Brigham Young and master's degree in taxation from
Brigham Young.
Q

Could you give us a brief background of your

work experience in the accounting field?
A

Yes.

Right after the University I started with

Peat Marwick, a big firm here in Salt Lake City.

After two

and a half years with them, I transferred to Arthur
Anderson and Company, here in Salt Lake City, I spent two
years with them.

I am now a partner in a CPA firm in

American Fork, have been for the last two years.
Q

All right, in the course of working with those

three accounting firms, was your primary background with
respect to taxation accounting?
A

Correct, all areas of taxation.

Q

And in the course of dealing with tax work, were

you called upon to value companies?
A

Yes.

Companies, division of companies and

equipment and assets of companies for gifting, and the
estate area, and also for valuing of trusts, and also in
the area of pension planning for employee stock ownership
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plans.

All companies are required to have valuations, and

also in general accounting valuation.
Q

In the course of your work, you have done

valuations, have rendered opinions on the values of
clients' companies?
A

Correct.

Q

Can you briefly describe methods of valuing

companies, book value of the company, income value, good
will?
A

There are basically three areas that make up a

value of a company.
assets.

It would be the inherent value of the

Let's say they have land or something that has

increased greatly, you would attempt to get a fair market
of those assets as opposed to the liabilities and come up
with a value of those assets.

Or you would value the

income streams by placing some sort of capitalization rate
on the the net income of the company from the past few
years.

There's a value attached to the name and good will

of the company.
Q

In this case you have been asked to render an

opinion as to the value of General Display as of the end of
May of 1992; is that correct?
A

Correct.

Q

General Display is currently in bankruptcy; is

it not?
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A

Yes.

Q

During the course of your valuations, do you

briefly describe the documents that you looked at before
you rendered an opinion of General Display?
A

Yes.

We gathered information—I gathered

information regarding the sales.

All this information is

for a six months, five month period from January 1 of '92,
through May 31 of '92.

The information we gathered was

pertaining to the sales, the accounts receivable, the
accounts payable, the assets, liabilities, cash flow,
disbursements, all areas of income.
Q

And you had in fact been the primary independent

accountant of General Display since February of 1989?
A

Correct.

Q

You have prepared their income tax statements?

A

Returns.

Q

Returns, I am sorry, since 1989, in fact the

returns of '87?
A

They were clients of Arthur Anderson.

When I

left Arthur Anderson I took work with me.
Q

You are aware of the accounting procedures of

General Display?
A

Yes.

Q

From the history that you have previously

testified to, have you reached an opinion of the value of
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General Display as of May 31, 1992?
A

It has no value.

The company has approximately

nine hundred thousand dollars of negative retained
earnings.
THE COURT:
A

What are negative retained earnings?

That means that the liabilities of a company far

outweigh any assets.

The company has approximately a

million dollars of current liabilities.
THE COURT:
A

How many?

A million dollars, and hard assets approximately

three hundred thousand dollars,
THE COURT:
A

Negative net worth then, is that it?

Correct.
THE COURT:

A

Liabilities exceed assets by that?

Correct.
MR. HOLBROOK:

Did you also try to value it

through the income approach?
A

Yes.

Over the last eighteen months, the company

has had a negative net income; therefore, any type of
income capitalization isn't appropriate because any
capitalization that you put on those income flows, once
again, are in the negative because it's never been in a
positive cash flow or positive income.
THE COURT:
bankruptcy?

Is it operating— What kind of
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MR. HOLBROOK:
A

Chapter 11.

A reorganization.
MR. HOLBROOK:

In this chapter 11 phase, is the

operating income limited?
A

Yes.

Q

Is there any ability to grow as a company?

A

That's a hard one to judge.

Any future value of

the company would have to come from—it would be built from
ground zero.
Q

Did you find any value with respect to the good

will of General Display?
A

I made contacts with customers of General

Display, that have been customers over the last eighteen
months.

I also have written documentation from other

customers.

In all cases, the value of the work that has

gone on over the last eighteen months or two years is very
poor.

They have complaints about the workmanship, all

needed to be replaced and the main value of General Display
out to the public, once again, value is zero.
Q

So in essence, in valuing through the book value

income approach, you have concluded there's no value.
That's because you can only go in the negative?
A

You never value in the negative value.
MR. HOLBROOK:

Thank you.

That's all I have.

We would submit it on that basis, and based upon
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the evidence that's been adduced, we think that we are
entitled to five hundred fifty-three plus thousand in
damages and also the costs.
THE COURT:

As hard as I tried, I couldn't find a

copy of your counterclaim in the file, but I assume that
your counterclaim states causes of action alleging breach
of contract and the measure of damages being the contract
amount which is unpaid.

The covenant not to compete, is

that specifically stated as a cause of action?
MR. HOLBROOK:

I am not —

no, I think it is just

as a general arising from the contract, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

I have a little difficulty

understanding what you are claiming on that quite frankly.
He would have —
years.

he did not compete for the period of two

I take it that he was required not to compete but

he engaged in the running of this business for a period of
time, didn't he.
MR. HOLBROOK:

No, he did not —

I can put him

back on.
THE COURT:

That's all right.

MR. HOLBROOK:

He did not take over and go back

into General Display until January of '92, so it was after
two years had run and that was basically the business in
the interim was supposed to be run by Joe LaSalle and
Kaufman and his agents.
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THE COURT:

You are asking me to give him the

difference between what he was earning at the time that he
entered into this agreement and what he actually in fact
earned during that period of time?
MR. HOLBROOK:

The best money he could have

earned*
THE COURT:

All right.

The court will award him

damages in the amount as indicated on plaintiff's exhibit 3
together with attorneys fees and costs.
THE COURT:

Prepare your findings of fact and

conclusions of law.
MR. HOLBROOK:
THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

We will recess,

(whereupon the hearing concluded)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
SIA AKHAVAN, and individual,
JOEL M. LASALLE, an
individual, GENERAL DISPLAY
CORPORATION, and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,

Case No. 900900439CV
Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
SIA AKHAVAN,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE,
Counterclaim Defendant,
REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION and ROLAND
KAUFMANN, and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive,
Additional Counterclaim
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
to the bench, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding, on July
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7, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. with respect to the claims and
counterclaims as between Counterclaimant Sia Akhavan ("Akhavan")
and Counterclaim Defendant Roland Kaufmann ("Kaufmann").

Akhavan

appeared in person and through his counsel, Douglas H. Holbrook
of Burbidge & Mitchell.

Kaufmann and his trial counsel did not

appear to defend against Akhavan's claims.

Kaufmann's special

counsel, Paul Durham of Durham & Evans, appeared only with
respect to Kaufmann f s Motion for Continuance of Trial, but did
not appear with respect to Kaufmann1s interests for trial.
The court having taken evidence in the matter, having
considered the same, and being advised in the premises, hereby
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

Kaufmann was properly served with process in this

action and by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's
jurisdiction over him.

Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been

represented by competent counsel from the law firm of Metzger,
Gordon, Scully & Mortimer and Leslieann Haacke, as local counsel.
2.

This case was set for trial in March of 1992, but

was continued at Kaufmann and his counsel's request.
3.

Kaufmann's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as

counsel of record on June 6, 1992, and in said motion represented
that Kaufmann could not appear at trial, either in person or
through counsel.
4.

Kaufmann further represented to the court, by

letter dated July 1, 1992, that he would not appear at trial.
2
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The court denied Kaufmannfs counsel's Motion to Withdraw and
informed Kaufmann and his counsel that if no appearance was made
at trial, then a default would be entered against them.
5.

Kaufmann and his counsel failed to appear at trial

in this matter despite adequate notice of the trial.
6.

In September of 1989, Akhavan owned an interest in

General Display, Inc., a business engaged in manufacturing and
selling commercial signs. At this time, Akhavan was told by Joel
LaSalle, president of General Display, that Roland Kaufmann was
interested in buying Akhavanfs interest in General Display.
Akhavan attended a meeting in September of 1989 with Robert
Radcliffe and Mannie Floor, who identified themselves as agents
for Kaufmann.

At this meeting the sale of Akhavanfs shares to

Kaufmann was discussed.

Akhavan and Kaufmann!s agents reached an

agreement with respect to the price of the shares, but not with
respect to the terms of payment.
7.

At this meeting Akhavan was told that Kaufmann

wanted to use General Display to merge with a public shell
corporation and subsequently make a public offering.
8.

Akhavan was never able to reach agreeable terms

with Kaufmannfs agents, so Kaufmann came to Salt Lake City from
Switzerland to negotiate the terms of purchasing Akhavanfs
shares.

Akhavan attended a meeting with Kaufmann in October of

1989 at Kaufmannfs office on Fort Union Boulevard.
9.

At this meeting, Kaufmann communicated that he was

very interested in buying Akhavan's stock in General Display.
3
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Kaufmann and Akhavan agreed upon the terms of Kaufmann ! s purchase
of Akhavan f s interest in General Display.

The agreed upon terms

were subsequently set forth in Exhibit 1.

These terms included,

but not were not limited to:
(a)

Purchase price of $300,000.00, payable $50 r 000.00
immediately with the balance of $250,000.00 to be
paid over 18 months at an interest rate of 10%;

(b)

Akhavan agreed not to work or compete in the
commercial signage industry.

This covenant not to

compete was for a period of two years;
(c)

Kaufmann and Akhavan agreed that Akhavan would
receive 25% of the net proceeds from any judgment
or settlement of the lawsuit entitled General
Display Corporation v. The Walt Disney Company;
and

(d)

If any lawsuit arose from their agreements, the
prevailing party would be entitled to attorney f s
fees.

10.

After entering into the agreement with Akhavan,

Kaufmann visited the General Display offices and manufacturing
plant and informed the employees the he was buying Mr. Akhavan f s
shares in General Display and would be infusing capital into
General Display to enhance its operation.
11.

Kaufmann made certain representations or omitted

to provide facts subject to his purchase of Akhavan f s shares
which he knew were false and/or made with reckless indifference
4
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to their truth or falsity.

These representations were made with

the intent to induce Akhavanfs reliance and cause Akhavan to
enter into the contract for the sale of his interest in General
Display to Kaufmann.

Akhavan reasonably relied on Kaufmannfs

representations which were material to his decision to enter into
the agreement for the sale of his interest in General Display to
Kaufmann.
12.

Akhavan was paid the $50,000.00 by Kaufmann, but

was never paid any other amounts owed under their contract.
13.

Akhavan contacted Kaufmann with respect to the

remaining payments under their contract.

Kaufmann informed

Akhavan that he had wired three payments to Akhavan.

At this

time, Kaufmann never stated or told Akhavan to look to someone
else for payments on their contract, but expressly agreed that he
would be making the payments.
14.

While employed at General Display, Akhavan was

earning $10,000.00 per month as salary.

His salary was based

upon his substantial experience in the commercial sign industry.
Upon entering into the contract with Kaufmann, because of the
covenant not to compete, Akhavan was not able to obtain a job in
the commercial sign industry, but was forced to seek jobs as
production managers of manufacturing plants.

The highest salary

Akhavan would have been able to earn as a production manager
would have been $3,000.00 a month.
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15.

Akhavan was not paid any money from the net

proceeds of the General Display v. Walt Disney lawsuit.

The net

proceeds were $173,000.00 of which Akhavan is entitled to 25%.
16.

Akhavan had incurred attorney's fees in

prosecuting this action against Kaufmann in the amount of
$44,212.50.

Akhavan would have incurred these expenses if this

suit was filed against Kaufmann alone, irrespective of the claims
against Radcliffe and Republic International Corporation because
the discovery which was necessitated in prosecuting claims
against all parties was identical.
17.

Akhavan is entitled to the difference between the

contract price, $250,000.00 of which is owed and outstanding, and
the current value of General Display which is zero.

Akhavan is

entitled to $7,000.00 a month under the covenant not to compete
for 2 years. Akhavan is entitled to 25% of $173,000.00 and his
costs and attorney's fees.
The court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact,
it now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Kaufmann was properly served with process in this

action and by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's
jurisdiction over him.

Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been

represented by competent counsel from the law firm of Metzger,
Gordon, Scully & Mortimer and Leslieann Haacke, as local counsel.
2.

This case was set for trial in March of 1992, but

was continued at Kaufmann and his counsel's request.
6
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3.

Kaufmann!s counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as

counsel of record on June 6, 1992, and in said motion represented
that Kaufmann could not appear at trial, either in person or
through counsel,
4.

Kaufmann further represented to the court, by

letter dated July 1, 1992, that he would not appear at trial.
The court denied Kaufmann's counsel's Motion to Withdraw and
informed Kaufmann and his counsel that if no appearance was made
at trial, then a default would be entered against them.
5.

Kaufmann and his counsel failed to appear at trial

in this matter despite adequate notice of the trial.
6.

There was a valid and binding contract entered into

between Akhavan and Kaufmann under the terms set forth in Exhibit
1.
7.

Kaufmann, in connection with negotiations for

executing the contract with Akhavan, made certain representations
to Akhavan which Kaufmann knew to be false and upon which Akhavan
relied upon in entering into the contract with Kaufmann.
Kaufmannfs breaches and misrepresentations have caused Akhavan to
suffer damages in the amount set forth in Exhibit 3.

Akhavan is

entitled to judgment against Kaufmann in the amount of
$553,563.53 and costs of $3,006.59.
DATED this

/&

day of July, 1992._
z 6y the[fcourt:

/A
^ D G E JAMES S. SAWAYA
Third"District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed,
postage prepaid, this /&

day of July, 1992, to the following:

Jeffrey P. Bloom, Esq.
METZGER, GORDON, SCULLY
& MORTIMER
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20005
Paul M. Durham, Esq.
DURHAM & EVANS
36 South State, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roland Kaufmann
Fincom Financial Consulting, Ltd.
Holbeinstrasse 31
P.O. Box 622
CH-8024 Zurich
Switzerland

aw akhavan\rad-find.fac
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Tab I

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
DOUGLAS H. HOLBROOK, Esq. (#5718)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendant and
Counterclaimant Sia Akhavan
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677

JUL 1 6 1992

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE,

janss^a
"m-sa-^oocwv,

Plaintiff,
DEFAULT ORDER AND JUDGMENT
-vsSIA AKHAVAN, an individual,
JOEL M. LaSALLE, an
individual, GENERAL DISPLAY
CORPORATION, and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,
Defendants.

SIA AKHAVAN,
Counterclaimant,
Case No. 900900439 CV
-vsROBERT D. RADCLIFFE,

Judge James S. Sawaya

Counterclaim Defendant
REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION and ROLAND
>KAUFMANN, and DOES l through
10, inclusive,
Additional Counterclaim Defendants.
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The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to
the bench, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding, on July 7,
1992 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. with respect to the disposition
of claims and counterclaims as between Counterclaimant Sia
Akhavan ("Akhavan") and Counterclaim Defendant Roland Kaufmann
("Kaufmann").

Akhavan appeared

in person and through his

counsel, Douglas H. Holbrook of Burbidge & Mitchell.

Kaufmann

did not appear in person and Kaufmannfs counsel, Paul Durham of
Durham & Evans, appeared specially with respect to Kaufmann's
Motion for Continuance of Trial only, but did not appear with
respect to Kaufmann's interests for trial.
Pursuant to the court's prior rulings that if Kaufmann
and his counsel failed to appear for trial a default judgment
would be entered, the court, having taken evidence in the matter
with respect to the issue of damages, attorney's fees and costs
of suit, having considered the same and being fully advised in
the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law;
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES the following:

1.

A Default Judgment is hereby granted in favor of

Counterclaimant

Akhavan

and against

Counterclaim

Defendant

Kaufmann in the amount of $553,563.53 in damages (including
attorney's fees) and the further amount of $3,006.59 in costs of
suit, for a total judgment sum of $556,570.12.
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2.

Said judgment in the amount of $556,570.12 shall

bear interest at the judgment rate of 12% per annum from and
after July 7, 1992 until paid in full.
DATED this

day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURTf" "?

THE-^ONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

js akbavan\judj5
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a copy
of the proposed Default Order and Judgment to the following
parties by depositing the same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid,
this ' ^

day of July, 1992:
Jeffrey p. Bloom, Esq.
Metzger, Gordon, Scully & Mortimer
1275 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20005
Paul Durham, Esq.
Durham & Evans
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roland Kaufmann
Fincom Financial Consulting, Ltd.
Holbeinstrasse 31
P-O. Box 622
CH-8024 Zurich
Switzerland
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